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Parents make sacrifices to rear children. And though some rewards of
parenthood are virtually immediate, other benefits cannot be realized
for years or even decades. In understanding the process by which repro-
ductive goals change, therefore, the demand for children should be
interpreted as in part a demand for a durable input that enters into
many lifetime production and consumption possibilities.! Given the
number of children parents want, their spacing undoubtedly confers on
parents relative advantages that might be explained in terms of either
their life-cycle production and investment environment or their antici-
pated psychological and economic "returns to scale" in rearing of chil-
dren at different time intervals.2 But as yet few theoretical insights have
emerged to prescribe how circumstances, even under static conditions,
affect a couple's desired regime of child-spacing. Clearly, it is still more
difficult to deduce how parents adjust their flow of births over the course
of time as environmental changes modify their reproductive goals.
As a first approximation, therefore, reproductive goals will be sum-
marized in terms of a desired lifetime stock of children. Accepting this
working hypothesis, economists have begun to explore parent-revealed
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demands for lifetime stocks of children as though conditioned by tradi-
tional determinants of consumer and producer demand: input and out-
put prices, income, technology, and tastes. Ignoring radically different
strategies in the timing of births, demand for annual increments to the
existing stock of children, or period-specific birthrates, should also be
systematically related to revealed demand for a lifetime stock.3 This
paper explores empirically several aspects of the time dimension of the
relationship between cohort fertility in Taiwan and the presumed deter-
minants of lifetime reproductive goals, namely, the value of time of
women and men proxied by their schooling, accumulated and recent
experience of child mortality, and the availability of birth-control infor-
mation and services. First, the accumulated stocks of births are analyzed
by age of woman, and regional variation in this measure of cohort fer-
tility is decomposed into effects operating through age at marriage and
through birthrate per year of marriage. Second, the simplest possible
stock-adjustment framework is fit to the data on reproductive stocks
and flows in Taiwan to describe the dynamics of behavioral change in
a population that has experienced disequilibrating demographic, social,
and economic change for several decades.4 Coefficients from stock and
flow demand equations estimated for various years are then used to
appraise whether in Taiwan these relationships are relatively constant
across birth cohorts and over time.
Several qualifications and limitations to this investigation should be
stressed at the outset, ones that cannot be corrected here for want of
appropriate individual panel data or analytical tools to cope with the
probable complexity of reproductive capabilities and preferences. The
most serious limitation is the unit of analysis: large regional populations
of women born in various time periods. These aggregates are the only
units for which data are publicly available on both the stocks and flows
of births in Taiwan. Investigation at the level of individuals is also im-
perative, permitting disaggregation by women's educational attainment,
a factor that appears crucial for understanding the changing age pattern
of reproductive behavior in contemporary Taiwan. Nonetheless, despite
the well-known deficiencies of aggregate data, it may still be fruitful to
estimate behavioral relationships at different levels of aggregation in
order to document the value and limitations of each unit of analysis;
to neglect widely available information on grounds of "principle" is hard
to justify.
Aside from subjective preferences of parents for bearing their own
children, social restrictions on their exchange in most cultures encourage
parents to produce their own supply.5 Variability in supply, or in the
biological capacity to bear children, prevents some individuals in all
populations from achieving their reproductive goals. Yet biological dif-
ferences in the supply of births do not appear to exert a dominant effect211 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
on aggregate fertility except under extreme conditions of malnutrition
and specific endemic disease, such as gonorrhea. It is assumed that in
Taiwan recent regional differences in fertility are not substantially af-
fected by such health and nutritional impairments to the aggregate
supply of births.6
Most studies of the determinants of reproductive demands have dealt
with high-income countries, and consequently consumer demand theory
is emphasized. In low-income countries, children are more obviously a
productive asset, at least at maturity if not always at birth (Mamdami
1973; Nag 1976). The theory of producer-derived demand for inputs
might provide a framework better suited to explaining differences in
fertility in developing countries. A standard model of investment be-
havior in a durable input assumes that demand is homogeneous of
degree zero in all prices, holding constant the interest rate (Griliches
1960). But imposing this restriction appears inadvisable in this case,
since a couple's demand for children is limited both because consumer
benefits from children are probably satiable and because the cost of
funds to invest in one's children is undoubtedly upward-sloping.7 Pro-
ducer-demand theory also relies on assumptions of constant returns to
scale, competitive input and output markets, and (observable) financial
markets for borrowing, none of which is appealing in the study of house-
hold demand for children.
It is still useful to explore the stylized dynamic framework of the
stock-adjustment model that has been extensively used to study demand
for durable producer inputs and durable consumer goods. The stock-
adjustment model applied to reproductive behavior is not invoked here
to prescribe the path of life-cycle accumulation against which reproduc-
tive performance of a cohort can be evaluated before it reaches the end
of its potential childbearing period. This shortcoming is, of course, just
another reflection of our inability to specify determinants of the spacing
of births. Substantial differences remain to be explained across countries
at one point in time, and among countries over time, in the relative
distribution of births by age of mother.8 However, subject to identifica-
tion and estimation problems discussed in subsequent sections, informa-
tion for women of a particular age can be used to infer the current speed
with which the apparent gap between current stock and lifetime desired
stock of children is being closed. If this response parameter is assumed
constant across a society but possibly variable over time, such a parame-
ter is estimable from interregional variation in age-specific reproductive
behavior. Comparisons between stock and flow predictive equations may
also help us understand how the demographic transition works its way
through a population.
The paper is ordered as follows. Section 4.2 describes a few salient
features of the situation in Taiwan for which a model is sought and212 T. Paul Schultz
relates the limitations of available data for testing an aggregate model.
The stock-adjustment framework is adapted to reproductive behavior in
the section 4.3, with discussion focused on the simplifying assumptions
implied by this model and on the estimation problems. Regional varia-
tion in cohort stock fertility is decomposed in section 4.4 into marriage
duration and marital fertility, to provide insight into the responsiveness
to environmental change of fertility and social institutions such as mar-
riage. The stock-adjustment model is estimated in section 4.5 and the
results are discussed further in a concluding section.
4.2 Description of Taiwan and Available Data
4.2.1 Demographic Transition
Mortality declined in Taiwan, notably among adults, during the pe-
riod of Japanese colonial administration of the island in 1895-1945
(Barclay 1954). Though the rise in per capita income among the Tai-
wanese in this interwar period was probably less than the substantial
growth in agricultural productivity, food consumption by the Taiwanese
increased (Ho 1966). The more dramatic second phase of mortality
reduction occurred after the Second World War, with land reform and
economic recovery. The greatest proportionate declines were achieved
among infants and children, and, though the evidence is not firm, the
rural public health program, universal education, and decreased income
inequality may all have contributed to this achievement. Undoubtedly,
the growth of income and personal consumption helped; since 1952 the
rate of per capita economic growth has been high by world standards,
particularly after 1962. Today the expectation of life at birth is 67 for
men and 72 for women, not far short of that recorded in high-income
countries.9
Though the demographic transition began building from the start of
the century, the first indication of a decline in birthrates emerged in the
late 1950s among older women, and then only after a moderate postwar
baby boom had run its course. But in the subsequent span of twenty
years, the total fertility rate-that is, the sum of annual age-specific
birthrates-decreased by half (see appendix table 4.A.l). This was
first caused by a reduction in the frequency of childbearing among
women over the age of 30, and in the last decade the pattern of declin-
ing birthrates gradually spread to younger women. This was accom-
panied by a slow rise in the age at marriage (see appendix table 4.A.2).
which can be traced irregularly back to the turn of the century (Goode
1970; Barclay 1954). As a consequence of the separation over time of
the declines in death rates and birthrates, the annual rate of population
growth in Taiwan increased from about 1% in the first two decades of213 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
this century, to 2.3% during the interwar period, and peaked at more
than 3.5% during the 1950s. Population growth has begun to ease in
recent years and was somewhat less than 2% per year in 1974 (appen-
dix table 4.A.3).
4.2.2 Family Planning Program
Taiwan organized and executed one of the first, most extensively
studied, and apparently most effective national family planning pro-
grams in the world. Starting in 1963 with a controlled social experiment
in the city of Taichung to determine the acceptability and effectiveness
of family-planning activity, in several years an islandwide program was
expanded to every township and city precinct in the country (Freedman
and Takeshita 1969). Analyses of regional birthrates and regional fam-
ily planning activity find a strong negative partial association between
the seemingly random allocation of family planning fieldworkers and the
level and decline in birthrates of women over the age of 30 (Freedman
and Takeshita 1969;Hermalin 1968,1971; Schultz 1969b, 1971, 1974).
The implied effect of program personnel on birthrates, however, dimin-
ishes from 1965 to 1968, and after about 1969 it becomes difficult to
assess whether the accumulated activity of the program has continued
to affect birthrates by a statistically significant amount (Schultz 1969b,
1971).
This finding can be explained in part as a natural cycle in the diffusion
of an innovation; with the introduction of distinctly superior technology
for birth control-the IUD and the pill-the period of disequilibrium
behavior that follows is likely to be shortened by the subsidized dissemi-
nation of information, services, and supplies relevant to its adoption.
But in contrast to the classical case of agricultural extension activities
in a dynamic productive environment, there has been only one quantum
advance in birth control technology, not a stream of improved inputs
and combinations of inputs to enhance yields and lower costs. Hence,
the family planning innovation cycle is likely to eventually meet with
diminishing returns to scale (extension effort per woman of childbearing
age) unless communication between generations is absent. This tendency
is already evident from cross-sectional analyses of program inputs and
birthrates after two years, even though the output of services and sup-
plies distributed to the population exhibited a more nearly linear rela-
tionship for several years (Schultz 1969b, 1971).
Another partial explanation for the difficulty of assessing the regional
effect of the family planning program after 1968 is the limitation of the
small (361 subdivisions) units of analysis and the uncontrolled inter-
regional flows of knowledge, services, and users (migration). The spill-
over of influence of local program activity beyond regional boundaries
may have blurred the cross-sectional associations between treatments214 T. Paul Schultz
and outcomes after several years. A similar spillover effect was thought
to have been a shortcoming of the Taichung City experimental design
in 1963 (Freedman and Takeshita 1969).
Regardless, program activity in the initial years is unambiguously
linked to lower birthrates among older women, and, as one might expect,
the two classes of fieldworkers working for different government agen-
cies appear to be substitutes for each other in bringing about this out-
come (T. P. Schultz 1974). Some indications are found that those re-
gions that were lagging in reducing their birthrates toward the levels
predicted by an economic-demographic model estimated from initial
period cross-sectional data were regions in which the family planning
program had its greatest effect (T. P. Schultz 1974).
Possibly more important than narrowing unexplained interregional
differences in reproductive performance, public support for the diffusion
of modern means of birth control narrows socioeconomic class differ-
ences in contraceptive knowledge and use and thereby moderates class
differentials in fertility that appear to especially penalize the upward
mobility of the lower class during the transitionary period of rapid pop-
ulation growth (Nelson, Schultz, and Slighton 1971; Freedman and
Berelson 1976). These changes in class differentials of contraceptive
knowledge, use, and fertility are carefully documented in Taiwan during
the 1960s and 1970s (Freedman et al. 1974), but it remains difficult
to infer how much of this change is due to Taiwan's family planning
program.
4.2.3 Education and Fertility
I should like to interpret educational attainment as a proxy for the
"value of time" of men and women. It is appropriate, therefore, for me
to marshal evidence of the relation between education and wage rates
for men and women in Taiwan. But I have as yet found no primary data
on this score and no published analysis of education's effect on earnings
in Taiwan.10 Though this probably reflects my inability to read the
relevant Chinese literature, it does not diminish the obvious emphasis
recently given to education by the government and the people of Tai-
wan. For example, from 1966 to 1974, the proportion of men age
20-24 with some junior high school increased 32%, from 0.44 to 0.58,
while exposure to junior high school increased 125% among women of
the same age, from 0.24 to 0.54. This increase in the proportion reach-
ing junio~ high school in an eight-year period is all the more remarkable
when one realizes that the size of the birth cohort to educate in that
period also increased by about 80%.
Direct evidence is available, however, that educational attainment is
associated with reproductive behavior in Taiwan, for whatever reason.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.217 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
renee, for mothers and for fathers, by age and educational attainment.
Three things may be noted. A sharp reduction in total fertility rates
(i.e., sum of age-specific birthrates times five) occurs among women
going beyond primary school. If the distribution of education must be
summarized by a single measure, the distinctly nonlinear relationship
with fertility is perhaps better represented by the proportion continuing
to junior high school than by an average number of years of schooling
(implyine a linear relationship), or by another higher cutoff point such
as college education, which is further from the mode of the educational
attainment distribution.
The second observation drawn from table 4.1 is more tenuous, for
here the cross section of age groups is used to infer the longitudinal pace
of reproduction. In 1974, better educated women start having births at
a later age than do less educated women, but they also appear to con-
tinue bearing children somewhat longer, into their thirties. This is a
relatively new pattern in later age- and education-specific birthrates in
Taiwan that was less evident in 1971 or 1966 (Anderson 1973; Taiwan
Demographic Factbook 1974, p. 15; Freedman et al. 1976). To investi-
gate these changing patterns of childbearing would require information
on stocks and flows of births by educational group, which are not pub-
lished. These changes in the timing of childbearing may explain why
earlier analyses of cross-sectional changes in birthrates found that the
negative effects of women's education on birthrates were attenuated
after age 34 (T. P. Schultz 1974). The partial association between cur-
rent births and sex-specific educational attainment may be seen more
clearly when conditioned on the number of children already born to
various educational groups.
The third regularity to note is the lesser, more ambiguous variation
in birthrates with father's education (table 4.2) than with mother's
education (table 4.1). From illiterates to those with higher education,
mother's total fertility rates decline almost monotonically by 53%,
whereas father's total fertility rates rise 13%, peaking among primary
school graduates, and then fall 28% below the level of those men with
no education. Since the correlation between husband's and wife's educa-
tion is substantial in most societies, we should expect the partial effect
of women's education, holding husband's education (and earnings) con-
stant, to be even more negative, and conversely, the partial effect of
men's education to be less negative and perhaps even positive. This
result would be consistent with our expectation that the income effect
of men's earnings will outweigh their price-of-time effect, but the price-
of-time effect embodied in women's value of time (education) will out-
weigh the income effect, reducing reproductive demands as women's
education rises (Willis 1974; Schultz 1976; Ben-Porath 1975).218 T. Paul Schultz
Though the advance of women in secondary schooling relative to men
has already been cited, table 4.3 presents the parallel data for literacy
and higher education and extends the data series to earlier birth cohorts.
Though women have gradually increased their literacy, as have men, the
notable advance of women into secondary and higher education has
occurred largely since 1950. It may be asked, How much of the decline
in fertility has been due simply to the increased educational attainment
of women? Partitioning the change in crude birthrates into changes in
women's age composition, educational composition, and a residual
change within age/education cells, it was found that 24% of the de-
cline in age-specific rates from 1966 to 1974 was accounted for by
change in the distribution of women by five educational classes (Freed-
man et al. 1976).
4.2.4 Child Mortality and the Demographic Transition
For reasons that may be intuitively plausible, if not derived from a
simple formal model of reproductive behavior, fertility is generally
higher in populations that experience higher child mortality rates. At
the regional or individual level, differences in child mortality are ob-
served to be directly associated with differences in fertility, moderating
Table 4.3 Educational Attainment at Ages 20 to 24, by Year of Birth and
by Sex (Percentages)
Minimum
Educational Level 1950-54 1942-46 1932-36 1922-26 1912-26
Literate
Men 99 97 90 85 69
Women 96 82 66 46 26
With some
junior high school
Men 58 44 27 34 20
Women 54 24 11 11 6
With some
higher education
Men 16 10 5 7 6
Women 10 5 1 1 1
Source: 1950-54 birth cohort-1974 Taiwan Demographic Factbook, table 4.
Earlier cohorts-1966 Taiwan census, vol. 2, no. 3, table 2.
Note: The 1950-54 birth cohort is observed in 1974, before all members may have
attended a higher educational institution. The earlier cohorts are all observed as of
1966 (census), and it is therefore assumed that no differential mortality by educa-
tional level affects their enumerated composition at that later date. The emigra-
tion of close to a million Chinese from the mainland in the post-Second World
War period notably augmented the male proportion with secondary and higher ed-
ucation in the cohort born between 1922 and 1926 and residing in Taiwan in 1966.219 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
and sometimes reversing the cross-sectional pattern between mortality
and size of surviving family. This evidence is strongly suggestive of a
mechanism, probably both involuntary (biological) and voluntary (be-
havioral) in nature, that achieves some manner of population equilib-
rium given environmental health and economic constraints (Schultz
1967, 1976; Dumond 1975). But existing evidence does not explain
how such modifications in fertility are accomplished, or how rapidly
they occur as the regime of mortality changes. Knowledge of the mecha-
nisms involved and of the lags in adjustment is essential to assessing
the duration of the current phase of rapid population growth in low
income countries and to appraising the gains and losses from policy
interventions that seek to improve nutrition and health and thereby to
reduce mortality more rapidly.
The data from Taiwan may be useful in exploring these questions; the
Household Registry System appears to be a relatively accurate source of
current information on fertility and mortality; the 1966 census retrospec-
tive information from women on their number of children ever born
and the survival status of their offspring is internally consistent and
plausible in all regions of the island. It is possible, then, in Taiwan to
hold past child losses constant and examine how the recent regional
variation in child mortality is associated with current fertility.
4.2.5 Overview of Available Data
The unit of analysis is a highly aggregated region of Taiwan: five
major cities and sixteen counties. Only for these large subdivisions are
the number of children ever born and the number of children living
reported by region and age of woman (1966 census). The Household
Registry System has published information since 1961 on births by age
groups of mothers, and deaths by age of the deceased. A number of
assumptions are made to estimate the stock of children ever born and
the number living for earlier and later years, using as a benchmark the
birth cohorts as enumerated in the 1966 census.ll
The marital status of women is reported by age groups and distributed
according to the year of first marriage (1966 census). The relationship
between mean age of a cohort and mean age of first marriage is approx-
imated within each region and used to interpolate regional estimates for
the standardized five-year age groups for which fertility data are avail-
able. Births are not published, to my knowledge, by current age of
woman and age of marriage.
Educational attainment of the population is available in various cen-
suses by age and sex and has recently been published by the Household
Registry System. Data on regional economic conditions are regrettably
scarce for Taiwan. A Household Income and Expenditure Survey is
tabulated by regions for the first time in 1970, but sampling variability220 T.PaulSchultz
may be a serious limitation of these data as well as the lack of disag-
gregation by age and educational attainment of household head. The
unweighted means and standard deviations of variables used in later
analyses are summarized in appendix table 4.A.4.
Since the regional observations for Taiwan coincide with five cities
and sixteen less urbanized and rural areas, it could be anticipated that
relationships noted between fertility and such conditioning variables as
child mortality and schooling could simply reflect urban/rural differ-
ences. If, in fact, other environmental conditions called "modernization"
or culturally induced "norms and tastes" were responsible for urbani
differences in fertility, then a causal role might be erroneously attributed
to health and education. Unless a case is made for the exogeneity of
observable variables that produce the conditions of "modernization,
norms, or tastes," it is difficult to conclude that these alternative factors
are better or worse at explaining fertility than child mortality and sex-
specific schooling. It is of some interest, nonetheless, to determine how
much of the partial association between fertility and specific character-
istics such as child mortality and schooling is captured by the direct
admission of different levels of fertility (stocks and flows) in urban and
rural regions. To perform this test, an urban dummy variable is intro-
duced into the explanatory model, even though we are unable at this
time to pinpoint precisely what objective features of the urban and rural
environment might be responsible for such shifts in behavior.
4.2.6 Conclusions
Taiwan was launched into the demographic transition by changes in
social and economic organization first imposed by the Japanese, fol-
lowed by heavy investments in the agricultural infrastructure (Barclay
1954; Ho 1966). Deeper structural change in the ownership of produc-
tive assets after the Second World War facilitated rapid industrialization
and urbanization, while policies also promoted the rapid modernization
of small-scale agriculture. Costly investments in education and public
health accelerated the declining trend in death rates and possibly fos-
tered labor mobility, both developments that are closely associated with
modern economic growth and enhanced labor productivity. The remark-
able pace of recent economic growth and fertility decline holds out the
possibility that more could be learned from this unusual period that
would have somewhat wider applicability and relevance for policy:
What was the role of growth in economic product, investment in human
capital, intervention to hasten the adoption of modern birth control
technology, and the peculiar social and economic institutions of Taiwan?
The available data, though exceptional with respect to aggregate demo-
graphic detail, limit the goals of this study to the examination of crude
proxies for the level and composition of personal household income and221 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
relative prices. To refine further the questions that currently occupy
economic demography, it may be necessary to analyze household eco-
nomic information, which will almost certainly entail the use of sample
surveys to collect time-budget data as well as income, wealth, and ex-
penditure detail (see Kelley's chapter in this volume).
4.3 A Stock-Adjustment Model of Reproduction
My objective is to estimate an adaptive model of demand for a dura-
ble good-children-that might clarify the process by which reproduc-
tive behavior responds over time to disequilibriums caused by economic
and demographic change. A framework to account for both stocks and
flows of births may also provide a means for modeling the important
component decisions that determine reproductive performance-the
timing of marriage and the spacing of births. The standard variety of
rigid stock-adjustment model is proposed as only a useful starting point
for such exercises.
To simplify the task, I neglect certain aspects of the problem that
might elicit different strategies of decision-making in forming a family.
A couple's reproductive preferences are represented by a single-valued
indicator of their desired lifetime stock of births. Several strong assump-
tions are implied. First, it is assumed that preferences among alterna-
tive family size outcomes greater or less than the single-valued goal do
not influence reproductive outcomes. In fact, given the uncertainty that
attaches to both the biological capacity to bear children and their subse-
quent survival and development, parents probably weigh the conse-
quences of a wide range of family-size outcomes that are likely to occur
with different probabilities conditional on their behavior (Schultz 1967).
Some segments of society exceed their reproductive goals and others fall
short of them, possibly because their preferences are asymmetric in the
vicinity of their single most preferred family-size goal. Pioneering re-
search on the measurement and interpretation of family-size preferences
indicates that asymmetries in these preferences may be important for
understanding differences in fertility in Taiwan, at least at the level of
the individual survey respondent or across education classes (Coombs
1974, 1976; Coombs and Sun 1978). When regions are the unit of
analysis within a single cultural area, this assumption may be somewhat
less restrictive.
The second simplification is required to deal with child mortality.
The frequency of child mortality is undoubtedly affected by the avail-
ability of household resources, by production and consumption technol-
ogy, and by relative prices, and in some circumstances it may even reflect
allocative decisions and preferences of household members, all of which
are to some degree endogenous. Nonetheless, it is widely believed that222 T.PaulSchultz
regional and time-series variation in aggregate mortality rates is attrib-
utable primarily to climate, public investments, available drugs and
medical knowledge, and modifications in social organization, not to
household decision-making. Therefore, given the scarcity of predeter-
mined factors that are thought to influence reproductive behavior, I shall
treat child mortality here as exogenous to the fertility decision.12
The consequences of child mortality for reproductive goals and be-
havior are too complex for me to simply restate demands in terms of
"surviving children."13 In the long run, as the level of child mortality
decreases the number of births needed to achieve a given number of
survivors decreases, and the average cost of rearing a child to maturity
decreases, while at the same time all investments in the human agent,
including children, appreciate in value (Schultz 1976). Though an econ-
omist may aspire to sort out these offsetting supply, price, and also
wealth and cross-substitution effects of mortality on the demand for
births, the essential question for population growth is simply the overall
magnitude and time path by which fertility adapts to change in mortality
(see Ben-Porath's paper in this volume).
4.3.1 A Simple Framework for the Joint Analysis of Stocks and Flows
With these simplifications, I assume that parents, at a particular time
t, desire a specific number of births, c,*, over their lifetime. Demand
for this durable stock will depend upon what people expect of the future
and, of course, on their own preferences. The formation of expectations
must be expressed in terms of current or past conditioning variables.
Psychological and economic aspects of habit persistence, perception,
information-processing, and uncertainty are all cited as justifications for
assuming the existence of distributed lags mediating the effect of stimuli
on behavior (Nerlove 1958).
(1) ill n
Ct* = a + ~ ~ f3ijZi' t-j-l + Ut,
i=1 j=1
where the Z;'s are M conditioning variables whose effect on C* extend
for n periods, a and f3i.i (i = 1, ... , M; j = 1, ... , n) are parameters,
and Ut is a residual disturbance that represents the net effect of many
omitted factors and any errors of approximation in the functional form
of the relationship. Given the central role of multiplicative interactions
between births, child survival rates, surviving offspring, and price effects
reflected in the relative educational attainment of women to men, the
dependent and independent variables in equation 1 are all expressed in
(natural) logarithms, unless otherwise noted.14
Primarily for biological reasons, a lapse of time is required for the
realization of desired increments to the existing stock of births, just as223 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
technological (and economic) factors introduce lags between capital
investment decisions in plant and equipment and realized increases in
productive capacity. Though the human gestation period is only three-
fourths of one year, the median interbirth interval for couples who report
they want an additional birth immediately varies from one to three years,
depending on age of spouses and perhaps on their health and nutritional
status.15
A conventional representation of the stock-adjustment process as-
sumes that a proportion, S(a), of the relative difference between desired
stock and the actual stock is delivered in each time period. For the study
of reproduction, a minimum lag of a year for conception and gestation
seems appropriate.
(2) C t - C t- I = Sea) (C*t - Ct - I ) +f(a),
where 0 < S(a) < 1, the index a being possibly related to a woman's
age, for reasons of biological reproductive capacity and the desired
relative distribution of births over the reproductive period, and f(a) is
an excess fertility function discussed below. Actually, the speed of re-
productive adjustment is affected by many considerations, only the most
obvious and perhaps not the most important of which is the biological
constraint imposed by reproductive potential. Given a lifetime reproduc-
tive goal of three children, and a tendency to have one birth every third
year after marriage before terminating childbearing, one might expect
Sea) to be about 0.1 at the start of marriage. The relationship may
deviate from log-linearity when large increases are sought, and of course
decreases in the stock are inadmissable. These shortcomings of the
stock-adjustment framework for the study of reproductive behavior are
analogous to widely recognized but frequently ignored defects of the
framework for analysis of investment behavior. But more serious, in
my judgment, is the inability to deal explicitly with the imperfect control
a couple exercises over the accumulation of stocks.
Because of birth control failures, some women wanting no more chil-
dren have births. Consequently, even when a cohort's average number
of births equals or exceeds the average preferred number of births, some
women may prefer more children and will therefore continue to try to
have additional births. Table 4.4 shows this "excess" fertility by mother's
education and age, as reported in a recent survey of Taiwan (Freedman
et aI. 1976). The precise behavior of f(a) with respect to age is not
clear, since the proportion of women wanting no more children (column
5 or 7) rises with age, whereas their current-period reproductive capac-
ity decreases with age. To sort out the offsetting factors that underlie
f(a) requires individual survey data on preferences and reproductive












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.226 T. Paul Schultz
the aggregate level of analysis undertaken here, tea) is simply inter-
preted as a margin of excess fertility that cannot now be statistically
distinguished from 8(a)a.
The annual flow of births or the birth probability is defined,
(3)
since the stock of births are expressed in logarithms. Substituting equa-
tion 1 into equation 2, a function for the growth of the stock of births
is obtained.
(4) Ct - Ct- 1 = 8(a)a+ tea) + 8(a)
M n
~ ~ {3ij Z., t-j-l - 8(a)Ct_ 1 + 8(a)/'-t.
•=1 j=1
If we collapse the expectation formation distributed lag into a dis-
crete lag of T years, say the mean length of the underlying distributed
lag, then either the flow of births relative to prior stock as in equation
4 or the current period as in equation 5 below becomes a simple expres-
sion of prior stock and discretely lagged conditioning variables.
(5) Ct = 8(a)a+ tea) 8(a)
M
~ {3;Z., t-T + (l - 8(a) )Ct- 1 + 8(a) /'-t·
i=1
Either equation 5 or a comparable discretely lagged version of equation
4 yields identical parameter estimates and standard errors. The high
collinearity between Ct and Ct-1 yields, however, a higher R2 in equa-
tion 5 and an "inflated" value of the t ratio for the coefficient on Ct - 1•
Hence, results are subsequently reported in terms of the flow equation 4.
Commonly 8(a){3i is interpreted as a short-run (one year plus T) de-
mand elasticity with respect to Zi, and (3. is the analogous long-run
demand elasticity. This interpretation, however, is not appropriate here
for the long run, since the value 8(a) is fixed only for a birth cohort five
years in breadth. For example, if 8(a) was 0.1, and the coefficient esti-
mated on Zi, t-Twas 0.5, the short-run elasticity would be 0.5, and the
five-year elasticity for a woman to pass through this segment of her life
cycle cannot be readily inferred from information about an age cross
section.
4.3.2 Estimation
Even when 8(a) is assumed constant, as may be tenable within a
narrow age group, the estimation of equation 5 presents problems. Many
of the omitted factors that account for the residual /,-t, in the desired
stock equation 1, persist for an individual population over time or for a
cohort as it ages. The disturbances are therefore likely to be positively227 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
serially correlated over time, at least toward the end of the childbearing
period, and ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates will be biased be-
cause Ct- 1 will tend to be positively correlated with 8(a)ILt. Notably,
the OLS estimates of (l - S(a» will tend to be biased upward (posi-
tively), and, conversely, estimates of Sea) are biased downward (nega-
tively) (Nerlove 1958; Griliches 1960,1961).
This simultaneous equation bias can be eliminated if the prior stock
is separately identified with additional information or, in this case, if one
or more instruments are obtained that are independent of ILt but are
related to Ct - 1• These instruments act as important identifying restric-
tions on this model of reproductive behavior; they determine the mean-
ingfulness of the entire exercise.16
The lagged fertility stock variable can also be replaced by its deter-
minants, and by repeating this substitution process until the start of the
cohort's reproductive period we can eliminate all lagged values of C
from the equation. This reduced form of the equation would require
simplification to be empirically practical. In the case of conditioning
factors, Z's, that did not change from the start, a single long-run re-
sponse coefficient could be estimated. The response to accumulated
cohort child mortality is less adequately incorporated into such a model,
for in this case the dynamic path of adjustment to the timing of the child
mortality may be important. But it seems a useful exercise, nonetheless,
to compare the short-run response coefficients obtained from flow equa-
tion 5 with the long-run response coefficients obtained from even a
simplified reduced-form stock equation. In the next section, I will discuss
empirical specification of Z and the choice of identifying restrictions
that permit one to estimate the stock and relative-flow equations.
4.4 Duration of Marriage and Marital Fertility Rate:
Estimation of Reduced Forms
Reproductive behavior in Taiwan is first summarized by fitting re-
duced-form relationships for the stock of children ever born per woman
by age as reported in the 1966 census. Within five-year birth cohorts a
logarithmic specification is estimated from data for twenty-one admin-
istrative regions of the island.17 The following cohort-specific explana-
tory variables are considered: (a) the reciprocal of the accumulated
child survival rate; (b) the proportion of women with some junior high
school education as a proxy for the value of a mother's time; (c) the
proportion of men with the same level of schooling (of the same age) 18
as a proxy for male labor earnings; and (d) the man-months of family
planning fieldworker activity in the region per woman of childbearing
age-15 to 49. All but the family planning input variable are expressed
in logarithms and derived directly from the 1966 census.228 T. Paul Schultz
Since cohort fertility may vary because of variation in either the tim-
ing of marriage or the level of marital fertility, these multiplicative
components are treated as dependent variables in subsequent parallel
logarithmic regressions. The sum of the regression coefficients (or elas-
ticities for those in logs) from the component equations equals the
regression coefficient from the overall cohort fertility regression; the
two-way decomposition of the logarithmic variance of fertility thus is
straightforward.
If those married in a given cohort were married for the same number
of years, on average, across regions, the readily observed proportion
married at a specific age would be a reasonable proxy for the mean
duration of marriage, except for a scale factor (constant) that would
change with current age. The nearly universal exposure of Taiwanese
women to marriage, however, makes this assumption unsatisfactory
among older women when variation in the proportion ever married is
relatively minor. For example, by age 35, 98% or more of Taiwanese
women have been married.19
More satisfactory figures for age at marriage are obtained from 1966
census tabulations of married women by current age and age at marriage.
How mean age at marriage is estimated from published data within
regions is explained in the second part of Appendix B, and estimates of
marital duration are reported in table 4.A.8.20 The logarithm of cohort
fertility is then linearly decomposed into two dependent variables: (1)
the logarithm of the average years of exposure to marriage per woman,
and (2) the logarithm of the residually defined annual marital fertility
rate-namely, the number of children born divided by the years of
marital exposure. Since fertility may vary over the life cycle, the level
of marital fertility rates may be expected to reflect this, and the constant
terms are likely to decrease among older age groupS.21
4.4.1 Cohort Fertility
Among women over age 30, when childbearing is nearly completed,
the proportion of women with some junior high school education is
negatively associated with cohort fertility (table 4.5). The absolute
value of the elasticity of fertility with respect to this measure of women's
schooling increases in the cross section to age 44, then diminishes (later
ages not shown). The partial association between men's schooling and
reproductive performance is less uniform, though a positive partial asso-
ciation is evident between the ages 20-24 and 30-39. The hypothesis
that in the postwar era the growth in men's schooling, and presumably
income, is associated with increased demand for children is not rejected
by these data.22 After age 24 the women's education coefficient (elastic-
ity) exceeds the men's in absolute value, and though the level of wom-
en's education is lower than the level of men's, it has recently been229 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Table 4.5 Regressions on Cohort Fertility or Stocks: Logarithm of
Children Ever Born per Woman by Age in 1966
Proportion with Some
Cohort Junior High School Family
Age of Constant Child Planning R2
Women Term Mortalitya Women Men up to 1965b (SEE)c
15-19 -2.98 20.1 1.07 -1.61 -144.0 .3628
(6.83) (1.75) (1.50) (1.17) (1.09) (.366)
20-24 -.613 22.1 -.269 .664 12.6 .6789
(4.21 ) (5.56) (1.57) (2.33) (.31 ) (.111 )
25-29 .562 5.94 -.0886 .0542 9.21 .8062
(10.2) (5.07) (1.54) (.58) (.64) (.0403)
30-34 1.07 3.28 -.0992 .0686 -9.81 .8913
(32.7) (5.90) (4.09) (1.79) (1.11) (.02410)
35-39 1.26 1.77 -.148 .103 -17.7 .8865
(32.4) (3.87) (6.29) (2.76) (1.69) (.0289)
40-44 1.31 .680 -.168 .0761 -17.3 .8777
(26.7) (1.59) (5.01 ) (1.18) (1.31 ) (.0366)
45-49 1.38 -.335 -.118 -.0452 -3.33 .8422
(20.8) (.78) (3.10) (.65) (.19) (.0466)
Note: Numbers in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t values. Obser-
vations are twenty-one major subdivisions of Taiwan for which data are published
in the Taiwan 1966 census, vol. 2, nos. 2 and 3.
aReciprocal of cohort's proportion of children ever born who are still living as re-
ported in 1966.census.
bMan-months of family planning fieldworker effort expended in region through
calendar year 1965, divided by the number of women in the region of childbear-
ing age (i.e., 15-49).
CStandard error of regression estimate is reported in parentheses beneath R2.
increasing at a much faster rate than has men's. Similar results are found
for both sexes when other levels of educational attainment are used in
place of junior high school.23
Child mortality is positively associated with cohort fertility among
women under age 45; after age 20-24 the magnitude of the elasticity
of fertility with respect to child mortality falls with age. The regression
coefficient on child mortality changes to a negative sign among still older
cohorts but loses statistical significance. Among women over age 39,
interregional variation in cohort fertility is insufficient to "offset" varia-
tion in child mortality. In other words, since the child mortality elas-
ticity is less than +1.0, areas of relatively high fertility report relatively
high surviving fertility. Among younger women the reverse is noted;
high-fertility areas are associated with relatively low surviving fertility,
other things equal. Problems of measurement lead one to suspect that230 T. Paul Schultz
the coefficient on child mortality is biased in a positive direction, but the
magnitude of this bias is likely to be substantial only for the younger
women.24
4.4.2 The Timing of Marriage and Marital Fertility
In diverse premodern and preindustrial societies it is observed that
the age at marriage is an important regulator of lifetime reproductive
performance. To perpetuate society and maintain family lines in the face
of heavy child mortality, couples are encouraged to marry and start
bearing children at an early age. This institutionalized adaptation to the
regionally anticipated level of mortality relieves individual couples of
some of the burden of controlling their fertility within marriage in re-
sponse to actual child mortality (Dumond 1975). A couple's fertility
might then respond to whether it experienced above- or below-average
child losses, but this latter within-marriage lagged response to child
mortality might be difficult to distinguish with aggregate data.
The median age at marriage in Taiwan increased from about 18 at
the turn of the century (Goode 1970) to 21 in 1940, and to about 25
today (d. table 4.A.2). Assuming that contemporary birthrates for mar-
ried women did not change, delaying marriage six years from age 18 to
age 25 implies two fewer births per woman; compared with traditional
cohort lifetime fertility of five or six births, this represents a reduction
in cohort fertility of one-third. An understanding of the causes for this
magnitude of secular change in the timing of marriage or even lesser dif-
ferences across regions should be a help in explaining fertility declines.
The questions I want to explore are the extent to which age at mar-
riage accounts for regional differences in cohort fertility, and whether
these patterns of marriage are readily explained by conditioning eco-
nomic and demographic variables that are thought to modify reproduc-
tive demands. In the traditional Chinese family the timing of the mar-
riage decision is, for the most part, made by parents for their children,
and relaxation of this control is a quite recent phenomenon (Wolf 1972).
The age at marriage, therefore, is likely to reflect the parents' perception
of the benefits and costs of earlier marriage, of which the interval to
childbearing is probably important, as well as the time parents require
to accumulate a girl's dowry. Conversely, the frequency within marriage
and the lifetime number of births may reflect to a greater degree the
perceptions and interests of the younger generation of parents. The eco-
nomic incentives of a husband's and wife's value of time are more likely
to make themselves evident in this later decision-making process, though
admittedly the dividing line between generations and their respective
interests is not always clear (Ben-Porath 1975).
The regressions on the estimated duration of marriage and marital
fertility rate are shown in tables 4.6 and 4.7. The duration of marriage231 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Table 4.6 Regressions on Duration of Marriage: Logarithm of the Average
Years of Exposure to Marriage per Woman by Age in 1966
Proportion with Some
Cohort Junior High School Family
Age of Constant Child Planning R2
Women Term Mortalitya Women Men up to 1965b (SEE)c
15-19<1 -2.92 20.1 .775 -1.48 -137. .3081
(6.00) (1.57) (.98) (.97) (.93) (.409)
20-24d -.177 25.0 -.356 .696 -7.68 .6384
(.93) (4.81 ) (1.59) (1.86) (.I5) (.145)
25-29 1.37 6.1 I .0676 -.199 20.2 .6146
(16.0) (3.36) (.76) (1.37) (.90) (.0626)
30-34 2.19 2.18 -.0060 -.0265 6.92 .5340
(45.0) (2.65) (.I7) (.47) (.53 ) (.0357)
35-39 2.63 1.04 -.0065 -.0162 7.22 .5287
(79.1 ) (2.66) (.32) (.5I) (.80) (.0247)
40-44 2.95 .507 .0053 -.0327 4.90 .4583
(107.0) (2.II) (.28) (.90) (.66) (.0205)
45-49 3.18 .315 .0124 -.0353 4.41 .4627
(126.0) (1.94) (.86) (1.35) (.68) (.0177)
Note: Numbers in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t values. Obser-
vations are twenty-one major subdivisions of Taiwan for which data are published
in the Taiwan 1966 census, vol. 2, nos. 2 and 3.
"Reciprocal of cohort's proportion of children ever born who are still living as re-
ported in 1966 census.
"Man-months of family planning fieldworker effort expended in region through
calendar year 1965, divided by the number of women in the region of childbear-
ing age (i.e., 15-49).
<Standard error of regression estimate is reported in parentheses beneath R2.
dMarital duration calculated by indirect procedure for women less than 25 years
old. See Appendix B. Regression coefficient for cohort child mortality is biased up-
ward because of measurement error, particularly for younger women, as exp:ained
in text and note 25.
within an age group is associated with the regional incidence of child
mortality among all cohorts of women over age 20. The regression
coefficients from the marital-duration equation for women age 30-34
(table 4.6), imply that a decline in child mortality from 15% to 5%,
as is recorded between women age 45-49 and 30-34, is associated with
a compensating variation in age at marriage of nearly two years, other
things unchanged. Though this estimate is probably biased upward be-
cause of problems of measurement,25 the linkage between child mortality
and the timing of marriage deserves further study to find out why it
arises, how fast it responds to change, and whether economic and social
policies can encourage this potentially important institutional response
to diminished mortality.26232 T. Paul Schultz
Table 4.7 Regressions on Marital Fertility Rate: Logarithm of Children
Ever Born per Year of Marital Exposure by Age in 1966
Proportion with Some
Cohort Junior High School Family
Age of Constant Child Planning R2
Women Term Mortalitya Women Men up to 1965b (SEE)c
15-19d -.0599 .0379 .290 -.126 -6.76 .4906
(.58) (.01 ) (1.72) (.39) (.22) (.0873)
20-24d -.436 -2.91 .0863 .0325 20.2 .5352
(7.62) (1.86) (1.28) (.29) (1.28) (.0435)
25-29 -.805 -.169 -.156 .253 -11.0 .2315
(l0.8) (.11 ) (1.99) (1.99) (.56) (.0548 )
30-34 -1.12 1.09 -.0931 .0950 -16.7 .4839
(20.5) (1.19) (2.32) (1.50) (1.14) (.0399)
35-39 -1.38 .723 -.142 .119 -24.9 .6939
(24.5) (1.09) (4.15) (2.21 ) (1.64) (.0418)
40-44 -1.64 .172 -.173 .109 -22.1 .7785
(26.5) (.32) (4.11 ) (1.34) (1.33) (.0460)
45-49 -1.80 -.650 -.130 -.0099 -7.72 .7828
(24.0) (1.34) (3.03) (.13) (.40) (.0529)
Note: Numbers in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t values. Obser-
vations are twenty-one major subdivisions of Taiwan for which data are published
in the Taiwan 1966 census, vol. 2, nos. 2 and 3.
aReciprocal of cohort's proportion of children ever born who are still living as re-
ported in 1966 census.
bMan-months of family planning fieldworker effort expended in region through
calendar year 1965, divided by the number of women in the region of childbear-
ing age (i.e., 15-49).
CStandard error of regression estimate is reported in parentheses beneath R~.
dMarital fertility rate calculated by indirect procedure for women less than 25
years old. See Appendix B. Regression coefficient for cohort child mortality is
biased downward because of measurement error, particularly for younger women,
as explained in text and note 25.
The proportions of men and women with junior high schooling are
not consistently related to women's age at marriage, except perhaps
among older women, namely those over age 44 in 1966 (table 4.6). In
older groups (not shown), there is a slight tendency for women to marry
earlier in regions where women had more access to secondary schooling;
conversely, men's schooling is associated with somewhat later marriage
among women, as is common today in high-income countries.
Marital fertility rates are not consistently associated at the regional
level with child mortality (table 4.7), but a negative bias at younger
ages is anticipated. The schooling variables, which are interpreted as the
value of husband's and wife's time, account for much of the regional233 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
variation in later marital fertility rates; in other words, birth control
within marriage is strongly affected by schooling in the anticipated man-
ner, with women's schooling depressing fertility and men's schooling
augmenting it.
When both men's and women's schooling increase by similar propor-
tions, marital fertility rates decrease among women over age 34. But,
given the actual proportionate changes in the past eight years (1966-74)
in men's and women's schooling for those age 20-24 (table 4.3), the
regression equations imply a 7% reduction in marital fertility rates for
women age 25-29, 9% for age 30-34, 14% for age 35-39, and 19%
for age 40-44. Since sex-specific levels of schooling are not notably
associated with the regional pattern of marriage, the effect of the ex-
pansion of the educational system, and in particular the relative gains
women have made in that system in the past twenty years, accounts for
large decreases in cohort fertility between the ages of 35 and 49.
Two years after the start of the national family planning program
there are already indications that local program activity is beginning to
modify the regional pattern of completed fertility among older women
(table 4.5). But for women 35 to 39 in 1966, only about 6% to 8% of
their children were born in 1965 and 1966. Thus the impact of the
program on their completed fertility must inherently be marginal, and
naturally this effect operates through reducing marital birthrates (table
4.7).
4.4.3 Tentative Conclusions
Among younger women reaching their thirties in the later 1960s,
regional variation in age at marriage appears to have overcompensated
for remaining regional differences in child mortality. In regions with
relatively high fertility and high child mortality, these younger cohorts
are achieving traditional reproductive goals at an earlier age than did
their parents' generation. If marital fertility is not excessively difficult
or costly to control, these younger women seem likely to reduce their
flow of additional births in the decade following the 1966 census.
Since a single cross section of a population by age provides no way
to disentangle life-cycle effects from birth-cohort or time-series effects,
the tendency for the elasticity of cohort fertility with respect to child
mortality (table 4.5) to diminish with age admits to more than one
interpretation.
Mortality in Taiwan appears to have declined most rapidly in two
periods: during the first decade of this century and again from 1945 to
1955. For women over age 44, born before 1921, childbearing was
largely completed during the second period. Moreover, many of the
offspring of these older women may have died in the dislocation and234 T. Paul Schultz
conflict of the war years and their aftermath of epidemics. A smaller
reproductive response relative to accumulated child losses among these
older cohorts might be anticipated.
Alternatively, as a cohort advances through its life, the elasticity of
fertility with respect to child mortality may be expected to decline, be-
cause offspring continue to die after their mother is unable to replace
them with additional births. This gradual process should be increasingly
noticeable after women reach 35 and average fecundity falls. The
marked decline in reproductive response to child mortality with in-
creased age can therefore be explained in terms of either life-cycle aging
or changing historical events. It is also possible that errors in measuring
child survival to a comparable age and the possible relationship between
early childbearing and infant loss might exaggerate the positive associa-
tion noted here between fertility and cohort child mortality, especially
among younger women.
In sum, fitting a simple reduced-form equation for stocks of children
confirms the commonly found positive relationship with child mortality,
the negative relationship with women's schooling, and a slight indication
that men's schooling is positively related to fertility. The family plan-
ning program inputs after two years are slightly related to lower com-
pleted fertility among women over age 29, which replicates earlier
analyses of birthrates and family-planning activity at a lower level of
disaggregation (Schultz 1969b). The regional cohort association with
child mortality is primarily explained by the earlier age of marriage in
high-mortality regions. On the other hand, the anticipated effects of
regional sex-specific schooling levels on fertility is not achieved by varia-
tion in the timing of marriage, but by changes in the rate of births per
year of marriage duration. The effect of women's schooling on marital
fertility rates is negative and consistent across age groups, substantially
exceeding the summation of positive men's schooling elasticities. The
advance made by Taiwanese women, both absolutely and relative to
men, in gaining access to secondary schooling in the postwar period can
thus account for a substantial fraction of the contemporary decline in
cohort fertility. Ifthese cross-sectional relationships are stable over time,
which will be investigated in the next section, they also imply that the
recent decline in fertility will continue.
4.5 A Stock-Adjustment Model for Current Fertility in 1967
The flow of births in 1967 as a proportion of the prior stock of births
in 1966 is the dependent variable in the simplified stock-adjustment
equation 4. Both ordinary least-squares (OLS) and instrumental-vari-
able (IV) techniques, the latter procedure being more appropriate if




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.237 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
contemporaneous schooling variables for men and women, period-spe-
cific child mortality and accumulated family planning inputs are lagged
two years and one year respectively. (See earlier work by T. P. Schultz
[1969, 1974] for justification of lag structures.) The lagged stock of
children ever born is identified by two instrumental variables: the co-
hort's prior child mortality experience, and family planning inputs prior
to 1966. The reduced-form equation that implicitly accounts for the
1966 fertility stock is reported in table 4.5.
The stock-adjustment model revolves around the parameter 8(a), or
minus the regression coefficient on the 1966 children ever born variable
(et-d. The instrumental-variable estimates of this parameter in table
4.8 for the seven childbearing age groups are as follows: 0.07, 0.15,
0.20,0.01, -0.01, -0.00, and -0.00. Given the low level and possibly
unplanned nature of fertility in older ages, the implied lack of discern-
ible compensatory adjustment in these age groups is not unanticipated.
The moderate and statistically significant level of the estimates of 8(a)
from age 21 to age 30 does not contradict the working hypothesis of the
adjustment model over the prime childbearing years, but these single-
year estimates for 1967 provide little support for the framework at
younger and older ages.
In contrast to the earlier analysis of cohort marital fertility rates, the
dynamic stock-adjustment model implied compensating higher current
flow of births to women over 35 in regions where child mortality has
recently been higher. When women are completing the formation of
their families, their reproductive behavior is likely to be more sensitive
to the survival or death of earlier children. This has been found empiri-
cally in numerous studies (T. P. Schultz 1974), and in this case the
short-run response elasticity is about 0.2 from age 30 to age 39. The
magnitude of this short-run response exceeds that which could be attrib-
uted to involuntary biological feedback mechanisms in a healthy popu-
lation (Schultz 1976).
Women's schooling is associated with lower current flows of births
among women up to age 35. For men's schooling, the positive relation-
ship is also apparent from 31 to 45. The men's and women's schooling
elasticities are of approximately the same magnitude among teen-age
women, the women's elasticities exceed the men's during the twenties,
and the reverse is true between the age 30 and age 44.
The intensity of family-planning activity by region is associated with
a decreased flow of births among women 31 to 45, those ages where the
family planning program is widely regarded to have made its major
impact (Freedman and Takeshita 1969; Freedman and Berelson 1976;
T. P. Schultz 1969b, 1974). A very different pattern of program effec-
tiveness emerges among women 16 to 26, where the flow of births is
higher in regions that are more intensively canvassed by the family238 T. Paul Schultz
planning program fieldworkers. This pattern of response among younger
women in Taiwan, which I have noted before (Schultz 1969b, 1974),
might be explained if the preferred path to obtain the desired lifetime
stock of children were itself a function of birth control technology. It
was hypothesized earlier that the delay of childbearing and the spacing
of births may be a means of reducing the likelihood of excess fertility
given the unreliability of traditional birth control measures. As modern
methods of fertility control become more widely accessible and under-
stood, birth intervals in Taiwan may increasingly conform to the pattern
of most industrialized countries where married women frequently par-
ticipate in the nonagricultural labor force. In some of these developed
countries, the intervals between births have indeed declined in the twen-
tieth century despite the reduction in completed cohort fertility. A corol-
lary of this hypothesis is that birthrates in Taiwan during the 1970s may
start to decline even before women reach age 30.
There are several methods for investigating the stability over time and
the internal consistency of these estimated reproductive flow relation-
ships and the reduced-form stock equations reported in the previous
section. One approach is to use the 1966 stock equation estimates in
table 4.5 to predict (average regional) cohort fertility in 1971, given the
observed values of the conditioning variables observed in 1971. This
exercise is reported in the upper panel of table 4.9. Apparently the 1966
relationship overpredicts declines in fertility in the youngest ages and in
the later ones. But between the ages of 25 and 39 predicted declines
parallel actual reductions in cohort fertility. The predicted declines
among women reaching age 40-49 in 1971 exceed that which might
have been achieved if they had given birth to no children in the period
1966-71. A margin of excess fertility implied by this exercise is not
inconsistent with the evidence presented earlier in column 4 of table 4.4.
The predicted reductions in cohort fertility are decomposed into the
changes attributable to changes in the four explanatory variables in the
lower panel of table 4.9. The contribution of declining child mortality
appears to be of increasing importance among younger women. The re-
versal in the effect of education between ages 35-39 and ages 30-34 is
a reflection of the lower educational achievement in the younger age
groups, who because of the war may have been denied educational
opportunities compared with the older age groups; the older cohort also
includes many better-educated immigrant mainland Chinese. The post-
war advance ofwomen in the schooling system appears linked to declines
in fertility, but this effect cannot be realistically partialed out from the
educational achievements of men, which appear to be offsetting. Taking
the groups together, education's effect varies from cohort to cohort but
promises to increase in magnitude in the next decade among women
reaching age 35. Family planning inputs account for 28% to 66% of239 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Table 4.9 Actual and Predicted Change in Sample Mean of Children Ever
Born, 1966 to 1971, Based on 1966 Stock Estimates
Age of Women in 1966 and 1971
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Relative changes
in sample mean
Actual -.045 -.052 -.101 -.101 -.054 -.027
Predicted -.120 -.036 -.109 -.144 -.135 -.062
Shares of
predicted change
Child mortality -1.67 -1.31 -.40 -.25 -.17 +.21
Women's schooling -.86 -158 -.22 +.07 -.18 -.173
Men's schooling +.98 +57 +.08 -.18 +.01 -.20
Family planning +.55 +132 -.146 -.62 -66 -.28
Men's schooling +.98 +57 +.08 -.18 +.01 -.20
Total -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Source: "Actual" cohort fertility based on projections as described in Appendix B;
"predicted" based on regressions coefficients in table 4.5, sample means of condi-
tioning variables in table 4.A.4, and projections of child mortality described in
Appendix B.
the predicted declines in cohort fertility after age 30. Although these
point estimates of the effect of family planning activity are not precise
(i.e., large standard errors are associated with these coefficients), they
are nonetheless large in magnitude. As a first approximation, this exer-
cise suggests that about half of the decline in fertility among women
over age 30 occurring in the period 1966 to 1971 could be attributed
to reductions in child mortality and changes in educational attainment,
whereas the remainder is associated with family planning.
Another way to test the stability of the 1966 stock-equation estimates
is to reestimate these equations in 1971 as shown in table 4.10. Several
changes may be noted between the 1966 and the 1971 coefficients. The
elasticity of fertility with respect to child mortality has increased and
become more statistically significant after age 25; educational elasticities
of both men and women increased in later ages; the coefficients on fam-
ily planning inputs are more statistically significant and of roughly sim-
ilar magnitude, as in 1966, though the level of accumulated inputs
increased fourfold over this five-year period. Overall, the vector of coeffi-
cients for the equation based on 1966 and 1971 data are not dissimilar.
Applying the F-ratio test to the linear restriction of coefficient equality
across years, one cannot reject the hypothesis of equality in any of the
six age groups at the 10% level.27
Accounting for changes in stocks is predictably more difficult than
explaining variation in levels. Reproductive behavior for a cohort ap-240 T.PaulSchultz
Table 4.10 Reduced-Form Stock Equation for Children Ever Born, 1971
Proportion with Some
Cohort Junior High School Family
Age of Constant Child Planning R2
Women Term Mortality· Women Men up to 1970b (SEE)c
20-24 -.664 21.8 .197 -.374 4.92 .5805
(3.31) (3.63) (.85) (.96) (.17) (.123)
25-29 .539 6.99 -.0979 .0722 4.61 .6900
(5.97) (3.33) (1.02) (.43) (.34) (.0539)
30-34 1.03 4.45 -.127 .107 -7.82 .7906
(15.1 ) (3.48) (2.12) (1.01 ) (.78) (.0378)
35-39 1.28 4.40 -.127 .127 -18.5 .7854
(18.6) (3.89) (3.58) (2.16) (1.66) (.0397)
40-44 1.35 2.62 -.141 .108 -14.7 .8021
(18.8) (3.03) (4.79) (2.24) (1.25) (.0427)
45-49 1.35 .847 -.165 .0839 -8.39 .8534
(19.8) (1.39) (5.69) (1.51) (.72) (.0405)
50-54 1.35 -.620 -.122 -.0200 11.4 .7923
(15.3) (.96) (3.44) (.29) (.75) (.0534)
Note: Numbers in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t values. Obser-
vations are twenty-one major subdivisions of Taiwan for which data are published
in the Taiwan 1966 census, vol. 2, nos. 2 and 3.
aReciprocal of cohort's proportion of children ever born who are still living as re-
ported in 1966 census.
bMan-months of family planning fieldworker effort expended in region through
calendar year 1965, divided by the number of women in the region of childbear-
ing age (i.e., 15-49).
CStandard error of regression estimate is reported in parentheses beneath R~.
proaching the end of its childbearing period may be predicted with a
reasonably stable equation, but year-to-year flows of births are more
volatile and possibly sensitive to the excessively rigid specification of
the stock-adjustment hypothesis and the functional forms adopted here.
To test the stability of the stock-adjustment equation, birth cohorts are
followed for eight years, 1967 to 1974 (see Appendix B), and since
each year's cross section of birthrates is in some sense a new observation
conditioned by changing stocks and environmental variables,28 the time
series of cross sections are therefore pooled. A sample of 168 observa-
tions for each birth cohort is thereby obtained, though the value Il(a) is
now undoubtedly changing as the cohort progresses eight years through
its life cycle, and its estimate should thus be interpreted with caution.
Another problem with pooling time series is the tendency for birthrates
to decline for a cohort after age 25 and, for most regions, within age
groups over time, contributing to a pronounced secular decline in the241 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
time series on relative changes in a cohort's stock of children. This ten-
dency may produce a misleading association with other strongly trended
variables, notably the past accumulated inputs of family planning in a
region. In table 4.11 I have chosen to introduce a linear trend in time
as one method for emphasizing the cross-sectional variation about the
time trend, and not the smooth time trends in variable levels.29 These
estimates are consistent, based on instrumental variables as in table 4.8
to identify the influence of the lagged-stock variable.30
Coefficients in table 4.11 should be compared with an analogous
average of the age-specific equations in table 4.8. The signs and magni-
tudes of the coefficients in the two tables are not notably dissimilar,
though some changes are according to expectation. The average effect
of family-planning inputs has diminished, as expected given the nature
of innovational diffusion cycles, though the allowance of a linear trend
in time may understate the program's role in the secular downtrend of
birthrates. The effect of child mortality, which is also strongly trended
downward, appears somewhat larger in the entire period 1967-74 than
it was in 1967, but a stable elasticity of about 0.2 to 0.3 is still evident
after a woman reaches age 30. The elasticity of relative increments to
the stock of births with respect to the proportion of women with junior
high school is negative at all ages, but the magnitude of the elasticity
is less than men's schooling for women between about the ages of 30
and 40. This is again consistent with other indications that men's school-
ing proxies an income effect that extends the years of childbearing until
the woman is in her mid- to late thirties, whereas women's schooling
conditional on the current stock of children exerts a dampening effect
on the flow of births throughout the life cycle. The magnitudes of the
adjustment coefficient are better behaved, except for a slight rise in level
for the oldest birth cohort. A strict interpretation of the stock-adjust-
ment hypothesis implies reproductive goals in the range of 5-6 births,
which exceeds survey responses, perhaps because of our inability to
explicitly identify the role of contraceptive failures. Overall, however,
these pooled results for the stock-adjustment equation are more stable
than we might have anticipated given the rudimentary nature of the
working hypothesis and the limitations of the aggregate data. There is
clearly an important systematic element of feedback from past stocks
to current flows of births that should in the future be modeled with
greater realism and examined in individual survey data.
A possible shortcoming of analyses of regional data such as are used
in this study is that explanatory variables may not account for fertility
differences within urban and rural environments but may only reflect
urban/rural differences in amenities that approximately parallel repro-
duction without causing differences. As expected, a city/noncity dummy








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.243 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
the other sixteen regions of Taiwan, is found to be strongly negatively
correlated across our sample with reproductive stocks among older
women, the simple correlation being on the order of -0.6 to -0.8 in
both 1966 and 1971; the city dummy variable is less highly correlated
with birth flows in 1967 among older women, namely -0.2 to -0.3.
Including this city dummy variable in the birth-stock equation often
significantly increases the explanatory power of the equation, particu-
larly for older women (see appendix tables 4.A.9 and 4.A.ll), whereas
it is not important in partially explaining regional differences in the flow
of births (table 4.A.10). The only variable whose coefficient is notably
altered by this modification in model specification is that of family plan-
ning inputs in the stock equation, where the previously noted partial
association is largely subsumed by the city/noncity distinction. The ap-
parent diminution of the effect of family planning on accumulated repro-
ductive performance is not confined, however, in the temporally better-
specified birth-flow equation for 1967. Quite the contrary. Overall, it
does not appear that child mortality and schooling patterns are only a
proxy for "urbanization" and capture this alleged modernizing influence
on reproductive goals and performance. Urban/rural differences in com-
pleted fertility remain, however, a spur to further research into repro-
ductively relevant characteristics of urban life or those who choose it.
In 1971, women by age 40 still had 10% fewer children if they lived in
the five major cities of Taiwan rather than elsewhere on the island (table
4.A.ll ), after controlling for important associations with child mortality
and sex-specific schooling. It is not difficult to think of many omitted
variables, particularly lagged conditions and ethnic diversity in these
large populations, that might account for this residual urban/rural vari-
ation in past reproductive performance. On the other hand, somewhat
unexpectedly, one finds that flows of births in 1967 conditioned on prior
rt:productive performance do not differ substantially across city and
noncity regional populations in Taiwan, holding constant the same four
seemingly crude proxies for child mortality, educational status of women
and men, and prior family planning.
4.6 Concluding Notes and Qualifications
How should disequilibrium be characterized, and how should behavior
be modeled as it adapts to unexpected changes in conditioning variables?
Theories of fertility, particularly in developing areas, are moving beyond
the widely replicated exercises of accounting for differences in lifetime
stocks of births, toward simplified explanations of how current repro-
ductive behavior is conditioned by past accumulated reproductive per-
formance and other variables. The past matters for present behavior and244 T. Paul Schultz
future goals, as in most areas of household behavior where the life-cycle
durability of decisions is inescapable.
But past outcomes and current behavior cannot be realistically as-
sumed to be statistically independent. The identification quandary arises
for lack of time-independent variables that conveniently perturb a be-
havioral relation in one period but leave it untouched in the succeeding
period. These exogenous variables are hard to come by, and to measure,
in the household sector, and those used in the last section of this paper,
though tenable, can easily be criticized for belonging in the current-
period distributed lag function. Moreover, the stock-adjustment frame-
work is only the simplest way to deal with a most complex process. With
more and better data for cohorts over time, more elaborate frameworks
may add much to our understanding of reproductive behavior.31
Another problem arises in part because I have worked with aggregate
data. The lack of information on individual preferences, or at least the
distinction whether or not parents want more births, limits how one can
treat the unreliability of birth control and resulting margins of "excess
fertility." Though these subjective variables add richness to a model
(Lee 1976), they also extract their claims, for to close the system they
too require explanation in terms of environmentally given conditioning
variables.
A third area that requires more explicit study is the age of marriage.
The timing of marriage has many implications for the allocation and
accumulation of resources in the household sector and the transfer of
resources between generations. Its effects on fertility are unmistakable.
As a starting point, decomposition of cohort fertility into an age at mar-
riage and a marital fertility rate may help to sort out sources of fertility
change over time and to clarify how social institutions respond to en-
vironmental constraints. Though the required data are available in vir-
tually every census and survey, analysis of age at marriage remains
uncommon using cross-sectional data. I have encountered few econo-
metric studies of the causes of time-series change in age at marriage
within communities or over generations within families, though much
thinking has gone into the problem (Goode 1970).
The hypothesis has been advanced that education's effect on a consid-
erable range of household behavior can best be understood in terms of
its influence on the marginal productivity of labor, and hence on the
opportunity value of time (T. W. Schultz 1974). But education surely
has other consequences for behavior, and abstracting a single "price of
time" may mislead if it is not recognized that time is not homogeneous
and perfectly substitutable over an individual's diurnal, seasonal, and
life cycles. The "value of time" hypothesis predicts that better-educated
women allocate more time and interest to market-oriented activities and
less time to child-rearing. How can one get directly at the mechanisms245 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
by which education influences fertility? Can a variety of subtler predic-
tions be advanced as to how education affects the value of time and
thereby the mix of inputs used in a variety of household activities, as
well as demands for final family outputs, such as children? Are there
other aspects of the husband's and vlife's economic contribution to the
family that can be quantified and related to schooling? What are the
consequences ot physical wealth on the household's choices? Does
wealth augment the strength of its owner's "time-value" based viewpoint
in the allocation of family resources, or does it increase the demand for
all normal goods, particularly leisure, without introducing an offsetting
price-of-time effect? In particular, does material wealth increase fertility,
even if it enters the family from the mother's side? What are the limits
to the family in terms of its ability to pool economic resources, and how
do they change with development? Modern economic growth places a
premium on regional and occupational mobility that seems designed to
erode the economic foundation of the extended family.
Finally, the intertemporal transfer of resources is at the very heart of
the nuclear family and its relations with previous and succeeding gener-
ations. It might be postulated that the increase by half in life expectancy
in many low-income countries in the last three decades would have re-
duced the rate of social time preference, with predictable consequences
for savings and investment behavior. The mortality reduction should
also enhance the returns on human capital relative to physical capital,
shifting the balance in family portfolios. Conversely, if income streams
can be purchased more cheaply in terms of physical assets due to rapid
economic development such as in Taiwan, will household resources allo-
cated to enlarging the subsequent generation diminish? The testing of
many of these propositions and obtaining a consistent set of assumptions
that account for related facets of household behavior could make the
"value of time" hypothesis pivotal for the study of the household sector
in low-income economies.246 T. Paul Schultz
Appendix A. Additional Statistical Tables
Table 4.A.l Age-specific Annual Birthrates for Taiwan: 1949-74 (Births per
1,000 Women of Childbearing Age)
Births Total Number of Births per 1,000 Women of Specific Ages"
Registered Fertility
in Year" Rate" 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1949 5,900 61 241 290 263 186 1II 27
1950 6,030 61 246 297 269 191 112 30
1951 7,040 68 287 349 311 226 132 35
1952 6,615 53 272 342 294 220 113 29
1953 6,470 48 265 336 292 218 108 27
1954 6,425 48 263 334 292 218 104 26
1955 6,530 50 273 341 295 219 103 25
1956 6,505 51 264 340 296 222 105 23
1957 6,000 45 249 325 275 197 92 17
1958 6,055 43 248 336 281 199 90 14
1959 5,990 46 258 334 270 190 86 14
1960 5,750 48 253 333 255 169 79 13
1961 5,585 45 248 342 246 156 71 10
1962 5,465 45 255 338 235 145 65 JO
1963 5,350 41 252 337 231 139 60 10
1964 5,100 37 254 335 214 120 52 8
1965 4,825 36 261 326 195 100 41 6
1966 4,815 40 274 326 188 91 38 6
1967 4,220 39 250 295 158 70 28 4
1968 4,325 41 256 309 161 68 26 4
1969 4,120 40 245 298 151 63 23 4
1970 4,000 40 238 293 147 59 20 3
1971 3,705 36 224 277 134 51 16 3
1972 3,365 35 208 257 117 41 13 2
1973 3,210 33 203 250 105 37 12 2
1974 3,045 34 197 235 96 35 10 2
Source: 1949-64, Demographic Fact Book 1964.
1964-74, Demographic Fact Book /974.
"Births are attributed to the year in which they are registered.
bThe total fertility rate is five times the sum of the age-specific birthrates. Perhaps
because of rounding, the totals do not always add up.
cBirths by age of mother divided by the midyear estimate of the number of women
of that age.247 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Table 4.A.2 Percentage af Women Ever Married in Taiwan by Age, 1940-74
Percentage of Age Group
Period and
Source 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1940 census 29.5 84.4 95.9 98.3 98.8 99.2 99.4
1956 census 11.5 70.6 95.2 97.9 98.5 98.7 99.0
1966 census 8.6 59.5 92.9 98.1 98.9 99.1 99.1
1970 census 7.2 49.7 91.3 97.8 98.8 98.8 98.8
1974 Household
Registry 5.8 44.1 84.9 95.4 97.0 97.6 97.4
Sources: 1940 census, table 13, p. 54.
1956 census, table 17, p. 265.
1966 census, vol. 2, no. 3, table 2, p. 125.
1970 census, extract, table 9, p. 135.
1974 Taiwan Demographic Factbook, table 9, p. 366.
Table 4.A.3 Selected Demographic Time Series for Taiwan, 1906-74
Crude Vital Rates
Natural Rate (per 1,000 Life Expectancy
of Population Population) Infant Death (Years at Birth)
Increase (per 1,000
Period (% per Year) Birth Death Live Births) Male Female
1906-20 1.02" 42 31 172 25-30
1921-40 2.32" 45 22 155 35-45
1947-49 2.5 40 15 _h _h _b
1950-54 3.58 45.9 10.1 37 56.1 60.2
1955-59 3.49 42.9 8.0 37 60.5 65.9
1960-64 3.08 37.2 6.4 30 62.7 68.0
1965-69 2.44 29.7 5.3 22 64.4 70.0
1970-74 2.01 24.8 4.8 16 66.5 71.8
Sources: 1906-40, Barclay 1954, pp. 13, 161,241.
1947-49, 1959-1961 Household Registry Statistics of Taiwan, table I.
1950-64, 1972 Demographic Factbook, Taiwan, table 1, 1970 Demo-
graphic Factbook, table 15.
1965-74, 1974 Taiwan Demographic Factbook, tables 61,74,76.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.249 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Table 4.A.5 Initial Estimate of Marital Fertility Rate by Age of Woman
Used to Calculate Beta
Initial Relative Initial Relative
Age ofWoman Value of Fertility Age ofWoman Value of Fertility
14 or less 0
IS .100 35 .125
16 .200 36 .100
17 .250 37 .090
18 .300 38 .080
19 .350 39 .070
20 .400 40 .060
21 .425 41 .050
22 .450 42 .040
23 .425 43 .025
24 .400 44 .010
25 .375 45 .007
26 .350 46 .005
27 .325 47 .003
28 .300 48 .002
29 .275 49 .001





Table4.A.6 Initial Proportions of Children Living by Current Age and by
Age of Mother in 1966
Age Group Age of Children
of
Mothers 0 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25 and over
15-19 .545 .455 0 0 0 0 0
20-24 .313 .624 .063 0 0 0 0
25-29 .149 .525 .305 .021 0 0 0
30-34 .066 .321 .414 .186 .013 0 0
35-39 .033 .148 .319 .341 .150 .009 0
40-44 .014 .064 .166 .295 .316 .137 .008
45-49 .004 .023 .074 .161 .289 .307 .142













Form of Age at Marriage
Tabulations in Taiwan 1966 Census
Current Age of Married Women
12-24 25-34 35-44 45-54
X X X X
X X X X












Source: 1966 Taiwan census, vol. 3, table 6.
Table 4.A.8 Logarithms of Estimated Marital Duration in Years and
Marital Fertility Rate per Year
Current Age of Women
15-19 20-24 25-29
Dura- Dura- Dura-
Region tion Rate tion Rate tion Rate
Taipei Hsien -2.10382 -0.37907 0.55780 -0.60008 1.72252 -0.81382
Han Hsien -2.32702 -0.31383 0.45386 -0.56378 1.82714 0.88363
Taoynan Hsien -2.19788 -0.30315 0.52947 -0.59850 1.75780 -0.81288
Hsinchu Hsien -2.53190 -0.44011 0.27596 -0.53876 1.52539 - 0.62567
Miaoli Hsien -2.95563 -0.37978 0.15718 -0.51614 1.69647 -0.81278
Taichung Hsien -2.79355 -0.32774 0.22025 -0.55726 1.72383 -0.83792
Changhwa Hsien -3.20471 -0.38523 0.09867 -0.55769 1.76350 -0.89020
Nantou Hsien -2.57412 -0.39012 0.42442 - 0.61280 1.75533 -0.82081
Yun1in Hsien -3.05406 -0.34214 0.42273 -0.06939 1.76606 -0.81746
Chiayi Hsien -2.79355 -0.41044 0.36615 -0.59859 1.71474 -0.78803
Tainan Hsien -2.85851 -0.39600 0.33541 0.56633 1.71127 -0.77974
Kaohsiung Hsien -2.40954 -0.33907 0.48844 - 0.60049 1.69939 -0.77058
Pingtllng Hsien -2.36250 -0.33907 0.54631 -0.64095 1.73837 -0.78945
Taitung Hsien - 1.461 14 -0.43598 0.93131 -0.69679 1.87130 -0.77446
HlIalien Hsien - 1.80229 -0.40681 0.76965 - 0.62858 1.89169 -0.84556
Penghu Hsien -2.22124 -0.40681 0.51707 -0.67512 1.68380 -0.72545
Taipei City -2.87916 -0.14497 0.10938 -0.50213 1.58571 -0.86141
Keelung City -2.31328 -0.29855 0.58543 -0.54755 1.74900 -0.80420
Taichung City -2.97814 -0.07310 0.21069 -0.47258 1.63904 - 0.80583
Tainan City -2.58319 -0.06786 0.15804 -0.53521 1.59571 -0.82723
Kaohsiung City -2.58319 -0.19582 0.46793 -0.63304 1.61767 -0.78990251 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Current Age of Women
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Dura- Dura- Dura- Dura-
tion Rate tion Rate tion Rate tion Rate
2.36912 -1.01742 2.75858 -1.20307 3.03816 -1.43261 3.25641 -1.64611
2.42640 -1.01091 2.79850 -1.16805 3.06907 -1.32586 3.28181 -1.51797
2.38573 -0.99612 2.76848 -1.15355 3.04460 -1.34002 3.26075 -1.52457
2.25035 - 0.86078 2.66619 -1.06082 2.95903 -1.25094 3.18525 -1.44524
2.35351 -0.96674 2.74529 -1.10062 3.02657 -1.25766 3.24586 -1.43801
2.37108 -0.98711 2.76076 -1.14050 3.04046 -1.30656 3.25878 -1.47185
2.39278 -1.01548 2.77602 -1.16066 3.05240 -1.31516 3.26870 -1.48560
2.38276 -1.00161 2.76533 -1.15637 3.04136 -1.31001 3.25744 -1.48560
2.39439 - 1.00955 2.77728 -1.16172 3.05348 -1.30157 3.26967 -1.43490
2.36939 -0.98332 2.76169 -1.14882 3.04272 -1.31312 3.26185 -1.45404
2.36981 - 0.99729 2.76347 -1.15425 3.04519 -1.31108 3.26475 -1.44204
2.35495 -0.97507 2.74756 -1.l3297 3.02875 - 1.30340 3.24798 -1.49287
2.36853 - 0.98359 2.75209 -1.13727 3.02864 -1.30868 3.24504 -1.46783
2.43966 -0.94375 2.79982 -1.09924 3.06405 -1.28396 3.27285 -1.49504
2.45088 - 0.98566 2.80739 -1.l4138 3.06966 - 1.30299 3.27724 -1.50264
2.34374 -0.89526 2.73788 -1.02009 3.01985 -1.21238 3.23956 -1.40605
2.30452 -1.09198 2.71839 -1.32313 3.01025 -1.56729 3.23589 -1.77588
2.38227 -1.01284 2.76695 -1.23370 3.04407 -1.42552 3.26083 -1.73593
2.33181 -1.02575 2.73715 -1.22409 3.02477 -1.42552 3.24787 -1.59262
2.31230 -1.04113 2.72546 -1.23271 3.01696 -1.42930 3.24239 -1.58972
2.31519 -1.05075 2.72211 -1.25518 3.01052 -1.45753 3.23410 -1.64437252 T. Paul Schultz
Table 4.A.9 Regressions on Cohort Fertility or Stocks: Logarithm of




Cohort High School Family Plan- Urban-
Age of Constant Child ning up to Rural R2
Women Term Mortality· Women Men 1965b Variabled (SEE)c
15-19 -2.53 21.5 1.41 - 1.57 -125.0 -.343 .4022
(3.99) (1.86) (1.79) (I.I4) (.94) (.99) (.3665)
20-24 -.551 22.1 -.232 .662 14.2 -.035 .6812
(2.30) (5.40) (1.11) (2.25) (.34) (.33 ) (.1138)
25-29 .722 5.83 -.079 .155 16.0 -.0826 .8534
(8.23) (5.53) (1.52) (1.62) (1.2I ) (2.20) (.0362)
30-34 I.I9 3.32 -.0681 .0952 -1.65 -.0592 .9297
(25.0) (7.18) (2.97) (2.87) (.21 ) (2.86) (.0200)
35-39 1.37 1.76 -.0973 .0959 -7.33 -.0691 .9339
(29.8) (4.89) (4.01) (3.25) (.83 ) (3.28) (.0027)
40-44 1.42 .704 -.124 .0805 -6.59 -.0759 .9180
(24.3 ) (1.94) (3.82) (1.48) (.56) (2.72) (.0309)
45-49 1.45 -.237 -.0998 -.0193 4.45 -.0599 .8612
(17.5) (.56) (2.57) (.28) (.25) (1.43) (.0452)
Note: Numbers in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t values. Obser-
vations are twenty-one major subdivisions of Taiwan for which data are published
in the Taiwan 1966 census, vol. 2, Nos. 2 and 3.
aReciprocal of cohort's proportion of children ever born who are still living as re-
ported in 1966 census.
bMan-months of family planning fieldworker effort expended in region through
calendar year 1965, divided by the number of women in the region of childbear-
ing age (i.e., 15-49).
cStandard error of regression estimate is reported in parentheses beneath R2.
dUrban-rural variable equals I for five cities (Tainan, Taipei, Keelung, Taichung,
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Cohort High School Planning Urban-
Age of Constant Child up to Rural R2
Women Term Mortalitya Women Men 19701> Variabled (SEE)c
20-24 -.582 20.9 .271 -.347 11.1 -.0707 .5942
(2.49) (3.34) (1.05) (.87) (.36) (.71 ) (.1244)
25-29 .556 6.83 -.0850 .0753 6.28 0.0139 .6917
(5.11) (3.06) (.79) (.43) (.41 ) (.29) (.0555)
30-34 1.l0 3.82 -.106 .153 -.617 -.0584 .8274
(14.3) (3.06) (1.85) (1.50) (.06) (1.79) (.0355)
35-39 1.36 3.74 -.0865 .145 -8.09 -.0680 .8280
(17.7) (3.40) (2.22) (2.63) (.70) (1.93) (.0367)
40-44 1.47 2.06 -.0725 .117 -.686 -.104 .8955
(23.1 ) (3.10) (2.50) (3.24) (.07) (3.66) (.03203 )
45-49 1.47 .534 -.104 .0860 3.92 -.0978 .9158
(23.0) (1.10) (3.53) (1.98) (.40) (3.33) (.0317)
50-54 1.46 -.640 -.0871 .00916 17.8 -.0875 .8331
(14.5) (1.07) (2.33) (.14) (1.23) (1.92) (.04942)
Note: Numbers in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t values. Obser-
vations are twenty-one major subdivisions of Taiwan for which data are published
in the Taiwan 1966 census, vol. 2, nos. 2 and 3.
aReciprocal of cohort's proportion of children ever born who are still living as re-
ported in 1966 census.
bMan-months of family planning fieldworker effort expended in region through
calendar year 1965, divided by the number of women in the region of childbear-
ing age (i.e., 15-49).
CStandard error of regression estimate is reported in parentheses beneath R2.
dUrban-rural variable equals 1 for five cities (Tainan, Taipei, Keelung, Taichung,
and Kaohsiung), 0 for seventeen rural areas.
Appendix B. Procedures for Regional Cohort
Projections
Consistent Estimates of Birth Stocks and Flows
First, the proportion married by single year of age j, in the ith region
is defined
Hlmj;(66) = (pj;(66) - sj;(66) )/Pi;(66),
i=I, ,21
j = 15, ,49256 T. Paul Schultz
where P refers to all women and s to those single or never married ac-
cording to the 1966 census (vol. 3, table 2).
In years after 1966, information is annually published from the
Household Registry on proportion of the population ever married by
five-year age groups. Using the individual year population totals for each
subsequent year, t, a predicted proportion married is calculated; for
example, for age 15 to age 19:
[
10 ] 19
19MI5.i(t) = ;~5 P;i(t) * mji(66) j~5 pj,(t).
I then define alpha (a) as a marriage deflator for each region, each
year, and the seven five-year age intervals for which Household Registry
data are available:
10aI5,i(t) = 19MI5.i(t)/19m15.i(66),
where 19m15.i(t) is the actual proportion of women between the ages of
15 and 19 registered as ever married in year t. If the age weights had
not relatively changed, and age-specific marital rates declined over time,
the a's would presumably increase and exceed unity after 1966. The
estimated proportion of women married by single year of age, in calen-
dar year t, can then be expressed for, say, age 18 as follows:
19m 18,i(t) = 19mI8.i(66)/19a I5(t)
The second step is to estimate birthrates for women by individual
ages, though birthrates are reported from the Household Registry only
by five-year intervals. Using initial arbitrary estimates of marital fertility
reported in table 4.A.5, denoted F;, that are not untenable at the national
level for the base year 1966, a similar procedure of deflation is per-
formed to obtain estimates of individual-year birthrates that are roughly
consistent with the changing age composition of regional populations,
marriage patterns, and age-aggregated birthrates as recorded in the
household registration system by date of registration, The base-year




and a birthrate deflator for the seven age intervals is defined as beta ((3),
19{315,i(t) =19Bl,U(t)/19b15.i(t),
where 19bI5(t) is the registered birthrate for women of ages 15 to 19 in
region i in calendar year t. Similarly, a final estimate of the birtbfate for
women of individual ages is obtained: .
19b18,.(t) = [Fl8 *j+lmj,i(t»)/10{315,i(t).257 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Women are then followed by individual years in the 1966 census age
distribution, attributing to them their estimated birthrates in subsequent
years, in addition to the number of children already born as reported
in the 1966 census. These single-year-of-birth cohorts are summed into
five-year age groups each calendar year, and observations are con-
structed to follow through time the aging regional cohort, neglecting the
effects of internal migration. Thus the 35- to 39-year-old women in
region 2 (Ilan Hsien) had 5.11 children on average in 1966 and in 1971
were estimated at age 40-44 to have 5.34 children ever born. In con-
trast, those women age 35-39 in 1971 had on average only 4.63 chil-
dren ever born.
Survival of Cohort's Living Children
The mortality rates for each region and year are read or calculated
for infants and children age 1-4, 5-9, and 10-14. Based on national
levels of age-specific mortality between 1965 and 1970, the mortality
rates for children age 15-19, 20-24, and 25 and over are arbitrarily
assumed to be proportional to the death rate for children 10-14 in the
region, where the factors of proportionality are 1.73, 2.55, and 2.90,
respectively. Mortality among older offspring is relatively low and in-
trinsically of less interest to us here because an increasing proportion
of their mothers are no longer of childbearing age.
To project the cohort's living offspring forward to the next period,
age-specific survival rates are applied to the age distribution of the
initial living children. The total number of living children for the seven
standard (five-year) age intervals of women is obtained by region from
the 1966 census (vol. 3). Initially, I assume the proportion of those
living children in each current age group is as arbitrarily reported in
table 4.A.6, chosen to be roughly consistent with national birthrates in
the early 1960s. But if absolute differences in infant mortality remain
substantial by region, as in Taiwan in the 1960s, it seems appropriate
to use regional Household Registry birthrates in 1966 to estimate di-
rectly the number of infants (age 0) by region and age of mother, and
use the relative proportions in table 4.A.6 to distribute only living chil-
dren age 1 and over. For example, women 20-24 in region 1 (Taipei
Hsien) registered a birthrate of 0.287 in 1966 and reported in the cen-
sus 0.938 children living. Ignoring infant mortality, the rest of children
living, 0.651, are distributed between the age groups 1-4 and 5-9 in
proportion to their cell values in table 4.A.6, or 90.8% and 9.2%,
respectively.32 Clearly, further refinements and more extensive checks
for consistency could be introduced by using information on registered
birthrates and death rates in prior years (Maurer and Schultz 1972,
p. 8), but these errors need not jeopardize our objective of obtaining
estimates of cohort accumulative fertility and surviving offspring.33258 T. Paul Schultz
Overall, the procedures described above should not introduce rela-
tively large errors unless the census and registry systems are incompat-
ible. The least satisfactory assumption is probably that embodied in the
uniform age-specific marital fertility schedule. There has been much
change in age-specific marital birthrates in recent years in Taiwan. As
the age at marriage has increased, the marital birthrate has increased
among those who still married early, between the ages of 15 and 19
(Anderson 1973). This may have been partially due to changes in the
age composition of married women in this interval (becoming older),
but it would also be consistent with a selectivity process by which those
getting married are increasingly fecund, either because they were preg-
nant before marriage (perhaps unusually fecund for their age) or in-
clined to start their childbearing immediately, and hence marrying at an
atypically young age. Whatever the cause, these changes in marital fer-
tility rates are not allowed to modify the relative shape of the schedule
but only displace the schedule up and down uniformly over the five-year
age intervals. This, in fact, may be a poor approximation for how marital
fertility schedules have been changing in different regions of Taiwan.
However, since our primary interest attaches to the behavior of older
women, I hope this defect in my calculations will not be a serious short-
coming for this analysis.
Estimates of Duration of Marriage
The 1966 census is tabulated by region, for women by five current
age intervals, and for those ever married by several age intervals of first
marriage (see table 4.A.7). Neglecting the intervals between dissolution
of marriages and remarriage, on which there is no information, these
census tabulations can be used to approximate the average number of
years elapsed since first marriage for each current five-year age group
of women.
There are three distinct issues: (1) estimating the mean current age
in the age intervals reported; (2) estimating the mean age at first mar-
riage in the age at marriage intervals; and (3) interpolating age at
marriage for the standard five-year age intervals to complement other
published data. In the first case, the mean age within current age inter-
vals can be directly calculated for ever-married women at the regional
level from single-year age distributions by marital status (vol. 3, table 2).
In the second case, two procedures are used. Among women age 25 or
more, most of the cohort is married. An estimate of the average age at
marriage (AM) for those married at each current age is calculated as
follows:
j = 1, ,5
k = 1, , n259 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
where the regional subscript is suppressed, j refers to current age inter-
val, and k refers to age-at-marriage interval. A relation over age cohorts
between AM and current age would be affected by the tendency of older
groups to have had more years to get married, increasing with age the
average reported age at marriage, other things being equal. Also, there
is some evidence that the median age at marriage has decreased among
more recent birth cohorts during the twentieth century (Goode 1970;
Barclay 1954). Linear regressions are fit within regions to the four
current age groups over age 24, with the mean age at marriage expressed
in either arithmetic or logarithmic form as a function of the current
mean age and an intercept. The arithmetic form accounted satisfactorily
for the secular upward trend in age at marriage and was used to inter-
polate values for five-year intervals over age 25-that is, coefficients of
determination were between 0.8 and 0.9.
For younger women a different approach was needed, given the form
of the age at marriage tabulations (see table 4.A.7). The working as-
sumption is that cross-sectional differences in the proportion married at
different single ages represents the marrying fraction of a stable "syn-
thetic" cohort that begins to marry at age 12. For women currently aged
15 to 19, for example, the average duration of marriage is then approxi-
mated as
19 19
19D15= ~ ~ (m;-mj_d*p/*(l-i))j ~ Ph
1=15 i=12 1=15
where the regional subscript is suppressed, and m; and Pj refer to single-
year married proportions and female populations of exactly age j. For
women currently 20-24, the summations over the l index run from age
20 to age 24.
To determine if the first method of direct observation yields results
similar to those of the second, comparisons are possible only over the
entire current age interval from 15 to 24 and later age groups. The two
resulting estimates of marriage duration for age 15-24 are correlated
at 0.99 over the 21 regions. At later ages the two approaches are, as one
might anticipate, less highly correlated.
The first direct interpolation method is used to obtain the estimates
of the average duration of marriage or years of exposure since first mar-
riage for the age cohorts older than 24 in 1966. The second synthetic
cross-sectional method is used to obtain the duration estimates for the
two younger birth cohorts in 1966. The natural logarithm of this marital
duration variable is reported in table 4.A.8 by region along with the
logarithm of the cohort's birthrate per year of exposure to marriage.
The sum of these logarithmic variables is, of course, the logarithm of
the cohort's average number of births per woman.260 T. Paul Schultz
Notes
1. The services produced by the numerical stock of children enter into many
family consumption and production activities. The output of these activities de-
pends on associated expenditures of time and goods, some of which directly en-
hance the value of the child services, such as the children's schooling and health.
Unfortunately, the final outputs of these family activities are not generally ob-
served or ascribed market prices. Therefore the dimension of demands for child
services that is used here is simply the number of children born or surviving to a
specified mature age. See Becker (1960); Willis (1974); DeTray (1974); Becker
and Lewis (1974).
2. See Zajonc (1976) for review of evidence and a stylized interpretation of
intelligence differences by birth order and number of siblings. Lindert (1974) pre-
sents new evidence on this pattern and provides an explanation in terms of a
mother's allocation of time among children.
3. Economic models of fertility have usually been formulated in terms of a
single period-static choice problem in which parents demand the optimal lifetime
stock of children for their income, relative prices, and technology (Becker 1960;
Willis 1974). Empirical tests of this framework have examined reproductive stocks
or flows as though one were proportional to the other. Easterlin (1968) and others
have stressed a dynamic mechanism by which fertility is adjusted in response to
the gap between actual and anticipated income. Linking cohort income deviations
to relative cohort size, Lee (1975) has proposed to complete the demographic
feedback loop. But in the context of low-income countries or in Europe during its
demographic transition, there is surprisingly little exploration of adaptive behav-
ioral models. Indeed, the period of demographic transition is interpreted by some
as convincing evidence that no generalizations are applicable beyond an ethnic/
cultural region (Coale 1969, 1973). Given the nature of the data available and
the sophistication of its analysis to date for evidence of multicausal relations, such
a broad conclusion may be premature.
4. The desirability of incorporating stocks in the interpretation of reproductive
flows was appropriately stressed by Tobin (1974). Though he is not responsible
for this application of the stock-adjustment framework, his comments stimulated
my search for the stock data analyzed in this paper.
5. Children are generally viewed by society as irreversible commitments by
parents, and markets to exchange children are not condoned except in placing
orphans or unwanted illegitimate offspring. But in Taiwan exceptional arrange·
ments historically evolved for combining adoption and marriage to provide parents
with the opportunity to "adopt out" girls and even boys into uxorilocal marriages.
It was common for a couple to adopt a baby girl who was later to marry their
son in a "sim-pua" form of marriage. This arrangement permitted a poor couple
to avoid the economic sacrifice of rearing a girl to marriageable age and assured
the adopting couple a loyal and servile daughter-in-law (Wolf 1972, chap. 11).
More than half of the marriages in the Taipei area before 1925 did not require
the transfer of a young woman into her spouse's household (Wolf 1972, p. 171).
Adoptions are today 50% more common for girls than for boys and equaled about
3% of the births in 1970-72. There are other reflections of the lesser demand for
girls (p. 60) including the reported historical practice of infanticide among girls
(p. 54). Contemporary analysis of birthrates reveals a greater reproductive re-
placement response when a male infant dies than when a female infant dies
(Schultz 1969), and preferences for male offspring are well documented in con-
temporary Taiwan surveys (Coombs and Sun 1978).261 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
6. See Tabbarah (1971) and Easterlin (1975). In fact, difference in health
conditions may affect the rate with which cohorts achieve their lifetime reproduc-
tive goals, but this effect is thought to be secondary to demand factors. To the
extent that health-related supply limitations were positively associated with child
mortality rates, the estimated partial association between child mortality and fer-
tility would be biased in a negative direction by the omission of supply limitations
or their determinants. There are still instances in which far less healthy and more
malnourished populations, such as exist in sub-Saharan Africa and Bangladesh,
might display regional differences in fertility that are attributable to differences in
reproductive capacity or supply (Mosley and Chen 1976). See also Easterlin,
Pollak, and Wachter's chapter in this volume.
7. Children as a producer durable expand the household's budget constraint (see
Kelley's chapter in this volume), but not indefinitely, given imperfectly elastic
supplies of contemporary inputs. For example, a small farmer might be able to
borrow to buy additional land for his sons to farm, but the capital market may not
view sons as the least risky form of collateral and might thus require an increas-
ing risk premium on such a loan.
8. See United Nations (1965) for evidence of dissimilar age patterns of births
across countries and over time. As yet no characterization of optimal child-spacing
strategies has gained wide acceptance, though models are implicit in several studies
(Sanderson and Willis 1971; Heckman and Willis 1975).
9. Barclay (1954, pp. 154-65) suggests life expectancy increasing from 25-29
about the turn of the century to 40-45 by 1936-40, but surprisingly little reduc-
tion occurred in infant mortality. Infant mortality declined from levels of 160 per
1,000 about 1940 to 32 by 1960 and 14 in 1974. (Taiwan Demographic Factbook
1974). Though some understatement of mortality exists and some transfer of in-
fant deaths to the second year of life probably persists in the registry, these errors
are unlikely to alter the noted trends or undermine confidence in interregional
variation in registered vital rates (Taiwan Demographic Factbook 1964).
10. I have since found a reference by Chien-shen Shih (1976, p. 296) to a
mimeographed study, "Rates of Return to Education in Taiwan, Republic of
China, July 1972," prepared by K. G. Gannicott for the Ministry of Education.
Gannicott's estimates of the social rate of return to education, as cited by Shih.
are 27, 12, 13, 13, and 18% per annum for primary, junior high, senior high,
senior vocational, and university education, respectively. It is unclear whether
returns are calculated separately for men and women or what secular growth in
real labor incomes is assumed that adjusts upward the cross-sectional age differ-
ences to obtain a synthetic estimate of longitudinal (cohort) returns to education.
II. These assumptions are discussed in the Appendix B; except for a variety of
smoothing procedures to interpolate values for individual years, the primary as-
sumption is that internal migration is not selective with respect to women accord-
ing to their fertility, and that age-specific mortality does not differ with the child's
mother's age.
12. In 1950, for example, multiplying out age-specific survival rates for Taiwan,
the life table probability for a live birth to reach age 15 was 0.84, and having
reached age 15 the chance of reaching age 30 was 0.95. In 1960 these survival
rates had increased to 0.93 and 0.97 respectively, and by 1974 they stood at 0.96
and 0.98. See Taiwan Demographic Factbook for 1964, table II, and 1974, table
34.
13. An obvious approach for dealing with child mortality is to choose a thresh-
old age at which to measure "surviving children"; an age before which most child
mortality occurs and beyond which survival prospects are favorable (see note 12).262 T. Paul Schultz
Though arbitrary, this procedure appears at first to be an improvement over
assuming that parents formulate their reproductive goals in terms of live births,
valuing all the same regardless of survival status (see O'Hara 1972 on problems
of evaluation and summation). But if we assume a multiplicative model of de~
Oland for births, and child-survival rates are an explanatory argument, we can
rearrange terms and directly test the hypothesis whether demand for "surviving
children" is indeed perfectly inelastic with respect to child mortality. However,
imposini'tl:ie "surviving child" hypothesis on the demand equation not only loses
information~makes it more difficult to interpret parameter estimates across birth
cohorts of women for whom child survival is inherently observed to different
threshold ages.
The equation estimated later in table 4.5 can be written
In CEB=a + (jln (CEBICA) + 'YIn SF + iJ/n SM
+ EFP+ p.,
where CEB is the number of children ever born per woman, CA is the number of
those children still living per woman, SF and SM are the proportions of women
and men with some junior high schooling, FP is family-planning inputs per woman,
p. is a normally distributed constant variance disturbance, and a, {j, 'Y, 0, and E are
estimated response elasticities. Rewritten in terms of the number of living children
per woman, one has
In CA = a {j + ({j - I )In (CEB) + '!.-In SF+ ~
{j {j {j
In SM +!- FP + p.1{j.
{j
But, if estimated in this form, the high definitional collinearity of CA and CEB
makes interpretation difficult, as would the admission of errors in measuring cohort
fertility. The "surviving child" hypothesis could be rigidly tested in this context
by determining if the coefficient on CEB were actually zero, that is, {j = I.
14. The measures of education and the inverse of the child-survival rate (based
on either cohort experience or recent period-specific rates) are essentially propor-
tions and are not unreasonably specified in the double logarithmic or constant elas-
ticity form. Family planning effort, on the other hand, is an absolute measure of
inputs up to the previous calendar year per potential recipient, and in this case the
exponential functional form has the appeal of permitting the elasticity to rise or,
more likely, fall with the scale of inputs. The predictive power of the cohort-
fertility equation was also increased slightly when family planning inputs were
specified in a form that required the fertility response to inputs to approach an
asymptotic limit, such as 1/(1 + FP).
15. Stochastic models of the biological components to their interbirth interval
are compatible with the distributed-lag framework, modified to allow the lag
structure to be unimodal and skewed to the right, such as the log normal in excess
of the minimum gestation period. See Sheps and Menken (1973) and Potter
(1975).
16. Another estimation approach was explored for three age groups (30-44).
An iterative maximum likelihood procedure would choose a value of 0, obtain
OLS estimates of {j where the dependent variables is Ct - oCt-1' and iterate on
oto maximize the predicted fit for Ct. Similar parameter estimates were obtained,
but t ratios were generally increased, particularly for women's schooling and child
mortality.263 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
17. Barclay (1954, pp. 248-54), in his classic study of Taiwan up to 1945, dis-
parages the idea that there is little variation in the prewar high fertility level
between rural and urban areas. He notes further that "it has not been possible to
find any evidence of association between fertility and other recorded types of be-
havior of rural Taiwanese by Districts" (townships), whereas "the strongest spatial
pattern of fertility was the sectional one, viewed in prefectual units" (counties
examined here). This puzzles him, since Taiwan was recently settled and did not
appear to have evolved distinct regional cultural traditions. Earlier, however,
Barclay did note that the prefectual spatial arrangement of mortality and fertility
is "somewhat the same." Though Barclay does not indicate what recorded types of
behavior he investigated, it seems unlikely that he looked at child mortality,
women's schooling, or women's labor force activity outside of agriculture.
18. The husbands of a cohort of women are, on average, older. But without in-
formation from the census on exactly how much older, the educational attainment
of men of the same age has been used here. The estimated relationship should not
be greatly confounded by this relatively uniform error in measurement. The ten-
dency would be for the estimated coefficient to be biased toward zero from that
for actual husbands who are older and less well educated than the age group used
here.
19. Cohort fertility can also be decomposed into the proportion married and the
number of children born per married woman. Since it is uncommon to find census
tabulations by age at marriage and current age and common to encounter tabula-
tions by marital status and age, it is worth noting that this less satisfactory de-
composition reveals roughly the same results as does the duration-of-marriage
decomposition (tables 4.6, 4.7). Particularly among the younger women for whom
the proportion married appears a reasonable proxy for marital duration, the asso-
ciations with child mortality are notable. Similarly, the education variables are
more important in the regressions on children born per married women.
20. Divorce is rare though not absent in Taiwan, but remarriage appears to
occur promptly (Barclay 1954, chap. 8). Presumably an increasing share of the
time since first marriage is spent without a husband as the cohort ages, owing to
widowhood. This effect may be impounded in the fertility regression constant term
among older women. Regional and time series variation in marriage proportions
and the frequency of divorce has been attributed to sex ratio differences in Taiwan
(Goode 1970, pp. 289-316), but this endogenous aspect of the problem is not
treated here.
2I. Standardizing these marital fertility rates according to a given reproductive
schedule is not necessary. There is obviously a parallel between this form of co-
hort fertility decomposition and the procedures adopted in the Princeton European
Fertility Study (Coale 1969, 1973). Since their methodology relies on regional
period-specific births and indirectly standardizes these for age and marital status
composition of the population, a Hutterite fertility schedule is used to weight the
age distribution. In Taiwan there is little evidence in cohort data of the tradeoff
found by Demeny (1968) in marriage and marital fertility indexes, but further
research on this issue is needed.
22. Though our expectation is that income from the husband's earnings increases
the demand for children, other things equal, this result does not follow from the
simple demand theoretical framework without additional assumptions (T. P.
Schultz 1974). Therefore a two-tailed t-test of significance seems appropriate in
evaluating the male schooling regression coefficients.
23. The p"roportions literate, with primary school (or more), and with senior
high school (or more) were used in place of the proportion with some junior high264 T. Paul Schultz
school (or more) as measures of schooling/wage rates. They were slightly less suc-
cessful in explaining fertility, but similar age patterns of regression coefficients
were obtained.
24. Since it is likely that higher fertility is associated with earlier childbearing,
the children of mothers' of a given age may be somewhat older, on average, in
regions where fertility is higher. With older children, child survival would be lower,
even if age-specific death rates are uniform across regions. This inability to mea-
sure child mortality to the same age level imparts an upward bias to the estimated
elasticity of cohort fertility with respect to cohort child mortality. In addition,
some evidence suggests that child mortality is greater among the offspring of very
young mothers (see also note 25). There are clearly many difficulties to disen-
tangling life-cycle relationships among age at marriage, fertility, and child mortal-
ity, and this investigation deals only with a few preliminary indications of such
relations.
25. As indicated in note 24, the relationship between marriage duration and
child mortality is undoubtedly overstated (positively), since women who married
earlier had their children earlier, on average. Their children were therefore older
at the time of the census and had experienced more mortality risks. This effect,
however, diminishes markedly as the cohort of women age and their youngest
children outgrow the period of heaviest mortality. But earlier-born children were
also exposed to the earlier and undoubtedly higher infant and childhood death
rates. This time-series effect and the duration effect would both tend to bias up-
ward the partial association between marriage duration and child mortality. Tech-
niques proposed by Brass, Sullivan, and Trussell to estimate life-table mortality
rates from retrospective survey information on child-survival rates should help to
mitigate the bias arising from the greater age of offspring of mothers that married
at a younger age.
26. Coale (1973, p. 57) is convinced that the timing of marriage, at least in
Europe, does not respond to reproductive goals, and he thereby directs his atten-
tion to changes in marital fertility as a precursor to the demographic transition.
"Few couples marry at 25 instead of 24 because of a calculation that they will
have one birth less; whereas the practice of contraception or abortion is directly
aimed at fewer births." Both components of cohort fertility may bear further
examination by behavioral scientists to better understand the demographic transi-
tion, even in the European setting.
27. The F-statistics with 5 and 37 degrees of freedom are 0.98, 0.45, 0.52, 1.55,
1.59 and 0.95 for the age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, and 45-49,
respectively. At the 10% confidence level, one could reject the hypothesis of coeffi-
cient equality if the F(5,37) exceeded 2.01.
28. Child mortality is observed in each year in each region through the age of
15. The measure of schooling of men and women-that is, the proportion with
some junior high school-is interpolated between the 1966 census and tabulations
published from the Household Registry system in the Factbooks of 1973/1974.
These changes would primarily reflect cohort migration among regions. Family
planning inputs are accumulated per potential recipient. A slightly better fit to the
data is obtained if the family planning inputs are transformed to II(1 + FP),
which implies more sharply diminishing returns to scale approaching an asymp-
totic limit as past inputs accumulate. The easier to interpret linear exponential
specification is retained in tables 4.8 and 4.11, however.
29. Another procedure is to include a vector of dummy variables for all but one
calendar year to account for yearly changes in flows, without restricting the trend265 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
to be linear. This more flexible procedure reduces degrees of freedom but implies
similar results.
30. As in table 4.8, the two variables used to identify the lagged endogenous
stock variable are the cohort's child mortality experience, lagged two years, and
family planning inputs, lagged two years. Note that the cohort's child mortality
is derived initially from different data than the period-specific child mortality level
that enters directly into the stock-adjustment equation. The former is based pri-
marily on retrospective child survival as reported in the 1966 census and adjusted
over time by period-specific death rates, as discussed in the Appendix B. The latter
period-specific variable is obtained from the region's age-specific death rates (for
all cohorts) two years before the dependent variable birthrate.
31. One step would be to estimate continuous distributed lag structures rather
than the discrete two-year lag in mortality and the one-year lag in family planning
inputs. Another step would be to model the innovation (birth control technology)
adoption mechanism along the lines proposed by Welch (1970), allowing for
more flexible substitution possibilities between classes of family planning workers
(Schultz 1969b) and interaction effects between women's (and men's?) schooling
and the application of family planning extension activity. When I explored such
interaction effects in the context of the stock-adjustment equation (tables 4.8,
4.11), the interaction coefficients were positive (as expected if women's schooling
substitutes for extension effort in diffusing modern birth control technology), but
not quite statistically significant from age 35 to age 44. The coefficients (and their
t ratios) for the cross-product terms were for age 35-39,29.3 (1.00), age 40-44,
20.0 (1.33).
32. The convention is followed of subjecting the calendar year's registered births
to mortality of that year on 31 December before obtaining the population of living
children for the next year. Hence, the census at the end of November 1966 is taken
as a year-end population total, in which the births are assumed to occur on the
last day of the accounting period. The 1967 year-end total of one-year-olds will
then be the 1966 registered births diminished by the 1967 infant mortality rates.
The small error in measurement introduced by this convention in the initial year,
therefore, will not be cumulative, though it will overrepresent infants in these
demographic accounts.
33. Methods could be applied at the regional level based only on current-period
fertility and mortality schedules by age. (See p. 8 of Maurer and Schultz 1972.)
Using more information about recent levels of birthrates and death rates seems
superior, though perhaps more complicated.
Comment Ronald Freedman
As usual, T. Paul Schultz has prepared a stimulating paper. He has
anticipated in one way or another most of the questions that might be
raised about his models and their empirical test, but discussion of some
of these problems may nevertheless be worthwhile, since a number of
points are debatable.
Ronald Freedman is professor of sociology and associate director of the Popu-
lation Studies Center, University of Michigan.266 T. Paul Schultz
The stock-adjustment concept, as I understand it, is the economist's
version of the demographer's cohort analysis, in which current and pros-
pective reproductive experience is examined in the light of past per-
formance of the cohort. This becomes especiaIly useful when (a) the
experience to date is broken down into different attained parities and
progression ratios, preferably by parity, computed from year to year;
and (b) for explanatory purposes significant social or economic sub-
groups are examined for differential cumulative experience to date and
differential progression ratios. This requires a great deal of data. How-
ever, a similar problem confronts attempts to make the stock and flow
concept applicable to meaningful subgroups.
As the stock and flow model is set forth, it involves making certain
assumptions that Schultz acknowledges might be problematic. I want to
discuss a few of these.
One assumption is that a constant proportion of the relative difference
between desired stock and the actual stock is delivered in each time
period across population categories. But a number of component ele-
ments enter into the timing of the adjustment flow of births. Among
these are spacing of births, age at marriage, and the preferred number
of children. We know that there is a strong relation between education
and first use of contraception for spacing. (See my table C4.1.) This
will tend to slow the absolute pace at which the better educated have
children once they marry.
Second, we also know that the proportion married at each age (espe-
ciaIly at the younger ages) is strongly related to education (see table
C4.5). If one measures the pace at which different educational strata
move toward their reproductive goals from similar ages, as this model
does, then late age at marriage also contributes to a slower rate of move-
ment toward the reproductive goal of the better educated. Working in
an opposite direction is the fact that preferred number of children is less
for the better educated (see Schultz's table 4.3), so any given absolute
pace of movement toward the observed goal means a faster rate of
attainment of the additional stock wanted for the better educated. In the
same direction, there will be smaIl effects making for faster movement
at higher educational levels because the better educated have higher
fecundity (Jain 1968) and make somewhat less use of breast-feeding
(Jain et al. 1970).
AIl these phenomena are changing over time. These observations
illustrate how a set of specific mechanisms that affect the timing of
fertility are changing differentiaIly between educational strata and also
between rural and urban strata (and five of the twenty-one regional
units in this analysis are Taiwan's five largest cities). A model that does
not take this into account is likely to miss essential elements of the dy-
namics that Schultz is valiantly trying to represent in the aggregate. The267 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Table C4.1 Percentage of Wives Who Have Ever Used Contraception and
Percentage of All Wives and of All Users Who First Used
Contraception for Spacing Purposes, by Wife's Education and
by Marriage Duration: Taiwan, 1973 (KAP-IV)
% Ever % of All
Using Wives First % ofUsers N
Wife's Contra- Using for First Using
Education ception Spacing for Spacing Total Users
Marriage duration 0-4 years
None 20.7 12.4 60.0 145 30
Some primary school 25.4 12.7 (50.0) 71 18
Primary graduate 30.7 21.8 71.2 815 250
Junior high graduate 54.8 39.7 72.5 146 80
Senior high graduate or more 65.0 56.4 86.7 197 128
Total 36.8 27.2 73.9 1,374 506
Marriage duration 5-9 years
None 62.5 17.2 27.5 355 222
Some primary school 61.8 19.8 32.1 131 81
Primary graduate 71.9 27.5 38.2 841 605
Junior high graduate 83.9 45.0 53.6 149 125
Senior high graduate or more 92.4 51.9 56.1 106 98
Total 71.5 27.8 38.9 1,582 1,131
Marriage duration 10-14 years
None 76.7 11.4 14.9 489 375
Some primary school 86.0 16.6 19.3 157 135
Primary graduate 85.8 21.5 25.1 599 514
Junior high graduate 92.3 31.9 34.5 91 84
Senior high graduate or more 92.9 51.8 55.8 56 52
Total 83.3 19.3 23.2 1,392 1,160
Marriage duration 15 years or more
None 80.7 5.4 6.6 503 406
Some primary school 85.4 7.3 8.5 247 211
Primary graduate 83.1 10.9 13.2 402 334
Junior high graduate 79.2 18.9 23.8 53 42
Senior high graduate or more 100.0 53.8 53.8 26 26
Total 82.8 9.2 11.1 1,231 1,019
Total 68.4 21.4 31.3 5,579 3,816
problem here is perhaps similar to the one Simon Kuznets addresses in
his paper (chap. 8): aggregation that summarizes components or pro-
cesses that are themselves moving differentially and in opposing direc-
tions in a rapidly changing reproductive regime may miss some essen-
tials, both for prediction and for understanding.
Schultz deals explicitly with some of these problems when he argues
that, while an assumption such as we have just discussed may not be268 T. Paul Schultz
justified at the individual or social strata level, it can be sustained for
the interregional analysis he is carrying out. I have two observations:
1. Five of the twenty-one regions he deals with are Taiwan's five
largest cities, and we know they are different from the other sixteen
units with respect to many characteristics, including the use of contra-
ception, the use of contraception for spacing births, and age at marriage.
Apart from the large number of development variables not explicitly
treated, there is a marked bimodality with respect to education. For
example, among women 25-29 in 1966, the proportions who were junior
high school graduates or more were 28% for Taipei, 15-18% for the
four other large cities, and less than 10% for fourteen of the other
sixteen units. Schultz deals mainly with only two predictor variables,
mortality and education. It seems plausible that their relationships with
fertility and nuptiality may be a function of some of the large number
of other variables in which the five big cities differ from the other sixteen
areas.
2. It is not necessarily desirable that using these particular regional
units washes out some specific relationships involving specific social
strata because they are not differential between regions, even though it
simplifies the equations. It can, and in some cases does, lead to omission
of important relationships that are pertinent to population dynamics in
Taiwan but that do not emerge on an interregional basis. Although the
analysis is in terms of the twenty-one regions, the inferences made, and
some of the public policy discussion, appear to lose this strict reference
and move to the individual or social stratum level.
A second basic assumption of the model is that preferences as to
number of children are distinctive single values and that "preferences
among alternative outcomes greater or less than the single valued goal
are assumed not to influence reproductive behavior." (All quotations
are from Schultz's paper.) Schultz properly acknowledges that "parents
... probably weigh a range of family size outcomes that are likely to
occur with different probabilities" and that "asymmetries in these pref-
erences may be important for understanding differences in fertility in
Taiwan at least at the level of individual survey respondent or across
educational lines." However, he adds that "when the regions are the
units of analysis within a single cultural area, the assumption may be
somewhat less restrictive."
In this connection he cites the work of my colleagues L. Coombs and
T. H. Sun, who have demonstrated the empirical utility of what they call
IN, a scale that measures the underlying preference structure for num-
ber and sex of children-a structure that lies behind the usual single-
valued preference statement on surveys. I think it is worthwhile for the
conference to have a few tables illustrating this work. My table C4.2,
for example, indicates within educational strata the variation in the269 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Table C4.2 Educational Level Differences In the Relationship of IN Values
to Selected First Preferences: Taiwan, 1973
First Preference for Percentage Distribution in IN Scale
Number of Children
and Wife's Education INI-3 IN4 INS IN6-7 (N)
First choice = 2 children
No education 31 58 8 3 (116)
Primary school 37 57 6 0 (518)
Junior high 37 57 3 0 (150)
Senior high and over 49 47 4 0 (216)
First choice =3 children
No education 5 23 38 24 (547)
Primary school 10 30 48 13 (1,430)
Junior high 13 42 43 2 (231)
Senior high and over 23 46 29 2 (157)
First choice = 4 children
No education 0 10 38 52 (642)
Primary school 1 12 45 42 (1,057)
Junior high 0 21 52 12 (70)
Senior high and over 4 20 64 12 (25)
Total 12 28 36 25 (5,463)
Source: Coombs and Sun (1976).
underlying preference structure or bias for smaller or larger numbers of
children for persons who have expressed the same first preference. My
table C4.3 shows that these variations in the underlying structure or IN
scale are associated with behavioral differences in contraceptive use after
adjusting for the effects of first preference and for whether the wife said
she wanted more children. Finally, my table C4.4 shows the variation
in preference structure with the rural-urban categories for persons hav-
ing the same first preference. This is particularly relevant to Schultz's
paper because it indicates the distinctive variation in the preference
structure of the five large cities among the twenty-one regions. The
assumption that the asymmetry is not pertinent to the regional variation
may not be applicable.
I turn now to some comments on the specifications and empirical
aspects of the model:
1. First of all, that five of the twenty-one regions are Taiwan's five
largest cities and that the other sixteen include all the smaller towns
and the rural areas leads to questions about a model that involves just
two explanatory variables-education and mortality. The five cities are
different from the other sixteen units with reference to a long list of
development and demographic variables. It seems likely that these other270 T. Paul Schultz
differences that do not enter the model directly would affect the relation-
ships Schultz measures. While he fully acknowledges this complexity
and the need for further detail in specification, I think the point needs
to be stressed, especially since he makes rather emphatic statements
about the connection between mortality and nuptiality that I think are
debatable.
2. Let us turn to that issue. Based on the analysis represented in his
tables 4.6-8, Schultz finds the support for the interesting and important
idea that there is a linkage between prior mortality declines and later
age at marriage, "which deserves further study to find out why it arises,
how it responds to change and whether social and economic policies
can facilitate this important institutional response to declining mortality."
It was this kind of statement that I had in mind when I said that findings
based on a rather specific and limited set of regional variations were
followed by inferences and policy speculations that transcend regional
Table C4.3 Relation of IN Values to Use of Birth Control, with
Adjustments for First Preference and Marriage Duration
(Wives 20-39 Years)
Percentage Ever Percentage Currently Percentage Ever
Using Contraception Using Contraception Using Abortion
Actual Adjusted Actual Adjusted Actual Adjusted
IN Values Ala A2b Al A2 AI A2 N
20-29 years
1-3 67 65 67 50 48 50 16 16 17 401
4 58 57 57 43 42 42 13 12 12 844
5 49 51 51 34 36 36 10 9 9 910
6-7 51 43 42 28 31 29 8 9 8 416
Total 54 39 II 2,571
30-39 years
1-3 87 88 89 76 74 75 29 30 32 240
4 84 84 85 72 71 71 30 30 30 691
5 84 83 83 70 69 69 30 29 29 1,028
6-7 76 78 77 65 67 66 23 25 24 927
Total 82 69 28 2,886
20-39 years
1-3 75 75 79 60 60 66 21 23 25 641
4 70 70 71 56 57 58 19 21 22 1,536
5 67 67 66 53 53 54 20 20 20 1,940
6-7 65 64 61 53 53 48 18 18 16 1,346
Total 68 55 20 5,463
Source: Coombs and Sun (1976).
aAdjusted in multiple classification analysis for first preference for number of
children.
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Table C4.4 Distribution of !N (Number Preference Scale) by First
Preference, for Five Large Cities and Other Regions:
Taiwan, 1973
IN
First Preference 1-3 4 5 6-7
and Small Large
Type of Place Families Families N
2 Preferred
Five large cities 50 45 4 0 454
Other places" 30 62 7 I 554
(Rural townships) 26 60 11 2 211
3 Preferred
Five large cities 13 33 44 10 714
Other places 8 30 47 15 1,662
(Rural townships) 6 29 46 20 764
4 Preferred
Five large cities I 15 42 42 390
Other places 1 II 42 46 1,418
(Rural townships) 0 12 36 52 758
Source: Data from unpublished work by L. C. Coombs and T. H. Sun.
"Includes smaller cities, and urban and rural townships.
differences. But I also have some questions about the relationship itself.
In the first place, one plausible explanation of the relation is that
mortality decline and later age at marriage are both responses to a broad
range of other development changes that differentiate the regions, par-
ticularly the large cities from the other places. Second, I have a question
on a technical point. The measure of mortality used in tables 4.6 and
4.8 are simply the survival rates for the children ever born to the women
in each age group, that is, the ratio of surviving children to those ever
born. You may remember that in tables 4.6 and 4.8 the relationship
between mortality and nuptiality or marriage duration is very strong in
the younger ages and rapidly diminishes with the age of the women. My
question is, To what extent is this a simple result of the fact that the
mortality measure is sensitive to the differential exposure to mortality
of the children that is related to marital duration?
In the young age groups, variations of a year or so in the age at mar-
riage will result in large variations in marriage duration and, therefore,
in the period of risk of child mortality. In older cohorts a variation of
a year or so in marriage age makes much less difference. To what extent
is the strong relation in the young ages a result of a mortality measure
that has a built-in nuptiality component, producing as an artifact a
strong correlation with nuptiality? This problem does not arise in tables272 T. Paul Schultz
4.9 and 4.10, where the mortality measure is directly based on age-
specific death rates and where the results in the relation to fertility are
therefore rather different. Schultz acknowledges this problem in a foot-
note, but, in view of the importance he attaches to the relation of
nuptiality and mortality, the nature of this effect needs empirical clarifi-
cation. On the other hand, in tables 4.7 and 4.8, on the basis of the
regional units, Schultz finds very little relation between education and
age at marriage or percentage married at even the younger ages. This is
inconsistent with the cross-sectional data for strata that show very strong
educational differentia!s in the percentage married, especially at the
younger ages. This relationship, which has prevailed for quite a few
years, is illustrated in my table C4.5 for 1966.
Perceptions that mortality of children is still relevant for childbearing
were still fairly common in Taiwan as recently as 1973. Responses to
this question: "People used to think families should have a large number
of children because some would die; do you think this is still important
these days?" are indicated in my table C4.6. About 10% answered
"very important" and 27% more said "fairly important"; only 19%
said "not important at all." The number of children preferred varied by
half a child between those considering mortality very important and
those considering it not important at all, even after adjusting for the
effects of education, type of residence, and marital duration.
Table C4.5 Proportions of Women Married by Age and by Education:
Taiwan, J966
Age and Edu- Percentage Age and Edu- Percentage
cational Status Married cational Status Married
/5-19 25-29
Illiterate 17.0 Illiterate 92.6
Literate 13.7 Literate 93.1
Primary school graduate 8.3 Primary school graduate 88.6
1unior high graduate 3.6 Junior high graduate 81.0
Senior high graduate 4.0 Senior high graduate 69.7
Total 8.7 Total 88.6
20-24 35-39
Illiterate 74.1 Illiterate 94.2
Literate 70.9 Literate 93.0
Primary school graduate 59.3 Primary school graduate 91.5
1unior high graduate 40.0 1unior high graduate 91.5
Senior high graduate 24.5 Senior high graduate 90.5
Total 57.4 Total 92.3
Source: Table II-I, 1966 Demographic Factbook, Republic of China, Department
of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government, October 1967.273 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
Table C4.6 Importance Attached to High Mortality of Children as Reason
for Having Large Families-Proportions Giving Various
Responses and Preferred Numbers of Children Related to





























"The question asked was: "People used to think families should have a large num-
ber of children because some would die; do you think this is still important these
days? Would you say, Very important, Fairly important, Not too important, or
Not important at all?"
bIncludes 0.6 no answer.
cAdjusted for wife's education, marriage duration, and type 'of place of residence.
A third basic aspect of the model specification interprets women's
education as a proxy for value of time-a common procedure in eco-
nomic models of reproductive behavior. I wonder if this is meaningful
with respect to marital fertility in societies like Taiwan, in which few
wives work in the modern sector. For example, Eva Mueller (unpub-
lished manuscript), analyzing Taiwan survey data for 1969-70 found
that only about 7% of the married women 22-42 years old were work-
ing away from home full time, and an additional 3% worked away from
home part time. Among these, almost half were wives of farmers who
often worked as agricu.ltural laborers for other local farmers. In addi-
tion, about 42% had worked at some time in the preceding year on a
family farm or in some other family enterprise. But that kind of work
has been found to have little relationship to fertility either in Taiwan
or elsewhere.
The role of education as an indicator of value of time in relation to
nuptiality is much more plausible and much more consistent with the
micro data than the relationship to marital fertility. A large number of
Taiwanese women do work in the modern sector during the period
before marriage. They often state their reason as saving toward a trous-
seau and household furnishings for when they do marry. A recent issue
of the Wall Street Journal called attention to a current labor shortage
in Taiwan. This is in the face of a large potential reservoir of well-274 T. Paul Schultz
educated young married women who might be expected to work under
the value-of-time interpretation. Apparently, so far the normative and
cultural restraints are more important than the demands of the labor
market.
I suspect that one reason why Taiwan fertility has not fallen even
more rapidly to date and why the strong preference for sons remains an
important barrier to more rapid fertility decline is that the institutional
restraints on paid work by wives means that their educational attainment
has not been translated into valued time that is redeemable in the mod-
ern labor market. A change in that situation might help to erode the
institutional basis for the strong preference for sons. In the meantime,
however, for married women education is not plausibly interpreted pri-
marily in terms of value of time.
An additional factor bearing on the value-of-time hypothesis is that
large numbers of Taiwanese couples of childbearing age are living with
parents or married siblings who could provide child care even if the
wife worked away from home. As of 1973, somewhat more than half of
the wives 20-39 were living in such extended households (Freedman
et al. 1978). In addition, 12% of the husbands' parents were living with
one of his married brothers in the same town, and visiting relationships
to couples living in nuclear households are reported as very frequent
and offer the possibility of child care. In a large proportion of these
cases the couple is also making financial contributions to the husband's
parents.
Schultz has quite properly called for additional research to get at the
meaning of the relation between education and fertility. In such a situa-
tion as Taiwan's, the value-of-time interpretation seems a little strained
for marital fertility but not for nuptiality, as I have indicated. In passing
I suggest several other possibilities: education in Taiwan, as elsewhere,
leads to nonwork activities and interests outside the home; education
and its close connection to mass media access exposes the individuals
to the Western role model of the small family and later marriage. Jack
Caldwell (1976) has advanced the view that this Western (rather than
modern) model has a powerful direct effect that is additional to devel-
opment per se in Africa and elsewhere.
Schultz calls attention to the possible continuing role of parental mate
selection, at least on nuptiality. I can supply some data on this point.
As of 1973, 50% of the Taiwanese wives 20-39 years old said that their
marriages had been arranged by their parents, 31 % by parents and the
couple together, and only 18% by the couple alone. Those whose mar-
riages were arranged did marry earlier than others and were more
poorly educated. There is also a carryover relation to preferred family
size after marriage. Those whose marriages were arranged wanted about
12% more children than other couples, even after adjusting for the275 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
effects of wife's education and degree of urbanization of place of resi-
dence.
Schultz specifies that a necessary assumption in the empirical work
is that migrants between the regions should not be different from the
nonmigrants with respect to fertility. I think one might add that they
also should not differ in the rate at which they reach their reproductive
goals. As of 1973, in the sixteen regions that do not include the five
largest cities the cumulative fertility of migrants was about 10% less
than that of nonmigrants for the age groups 30-34 and 35-39, and in
these age groups the migrants had a larger proportion of couples origi-
nally using contraception to space their children. (A migrant is here
defined as a person who has moved between townships, which are sub-
categories of the regions; so these are not necessarily all interregional
migrants in terms of the Schultz model.)
M. C. Chang (1976) also shows that, among migrants from rural
areas to large cities, both preferred and actual fertility tend to be lower
for migrants than for nonmigrants at the place of destination (as well
as at place of origin) after adjustment for effect of age and duration of
marriage. Chang's analysis is based on a definition of migration as in-
volving a move from place of birth to current place of residence.
Schultz uses one of his regression equations and micro data for 1966-
74 to estimate reductions in marital fertility attributable to education
ranging from 7% to 18% as one moves from ages 25-29 to ages 40-44.
This can be compared with total declines in marital fertility at these
ages ranging from about 25% at ages 25-29 to 75% at ages 40-44.
This averages out to be about 25 % of the total marital fertility decline
as attributable to education changes and 75 % to changes within educa-
tion categories-closely comparable to the finding Schultz cited from
work based on analyses of the vital statistics. It is important to keep in
mind that the decline in fertility within educational strata is three times
as great as the decline attributable to structural changes in the educa-
tional distribution. This, together with the rapidity of the decline, is one
plausible argument for rapid diffusion of birth control consistent with
program effort effects during this period in Taiwan, involving women
of low educational status at least as much as those of high educational
status. It also indicates an important phenomenon affecting fertility that
is not so well represented by macro data at the regional level.
In this connection, a fact Schultz mentions-that well-educated
women were having their children later into the thirties in 1974 than
the less well educated-is not a result of any known new trend toward
postponement of births f2!:-Jhos{YWe-lreducated. It results instead from
the fact that, while age-specific birthrates declined for all educational
strata between 1966 and 1974, the much greater decline in this period
for the poorly educated at the older ages (over 30) means that the276 T. Paul Schultz
differentials in period rates by education were reversed from a high
negative relation in 1966 to a modest positive relation by 1974.
In his comments on the final stock-adjustment model (table 4.9),
Schultz finds that inputs of the family planning program are uniquely
positively correlated to fertility at ages 15-19 and 20-24, and the ex-
pected negative correlation appears at older ages. He offers a possible
interpretation of the peculiar relationship at younger ages that would be
plausible if "the preferred path to obtain the desired stock of children
were itself a function of birth control technology." I interpret Schultz
to mean here that these young women either married early or had their
babies early in order to attain desired family size very quickly and then
stopped childbearing with the aid of birth control. He draws as a pos-
sible parallel the shorter birth interval in the twentieth century, along
with lower fertility in some Western countries. I do not find this inter-
pretation highly plausible.
The married women at ages 15-19 and 20-24 have been increasingly
the select group who did not postpone marriage. They are significantly
less well educated than those who did not marry young, and a substan-
tial proportion, especially of those 15-19, were premaritally pregnant.
In 1966, for example, only 9% of the women 15-19 were married and,
among these, 32% were less than primary school graduates and only
8% had more than a primary education. Among those 20-24 years old
in 1966, 58% were married and, among these, 37% were less than
primary school graduates and only 12% had more than a primary edu-
cation. A further consideration is that during this period around 1966
the family planning program was primarily directed to and accepted by
couples with at least two living children. This is not the kind of group
background from which one would expect the rational reproductive
regime I understand Schultz to be describing. They are more plausibly
the backward, rather than a vanguard, group in areas of rapid transition.
Finally, setting aside the specifics, the general objective Schultz sets
forth is certainly desirable. We do need better models and more appro-
priate data to permit us to relate dynamic changes in the reproductive
system to dynamic changes in the social and economic system. As he
indicates for ~veloping countries, this requires dealing with relation-
ships under conditions of disequilibrium. In these circumstances, I think
it is particularly important to have, as part of the enterprise, initial dis-
aggregation of important variables that are subparts of the model when
we have reason to believe that elements in such subsystems are changing
at differential rates for different strata of the population. This, as I have
tried to indicate, is probably the case with respect to the dependent
variable in the stock-adjustment model-the rate at which major groups
of families are moving from the existing number of children ever born
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Fertility is part of a very complex biosocial system. Demographers
have made some progress in taking elements of this system apart and
measuring their dynamic components. We have done less well in putting
the parts back together into models that represent the functioning whole
or in relating the reproductive system to the social and economic deter-
minants on a cohort basis. Economists are more skilled, and I think
more interested, in building models, especially at the macro level or with
macro units. Demographers tend to be more concerned with empirical
specifics, with data at the social and demographic stratum level. The
broad goal Schultz sets forth requires both kinds of materials. Otherwise
an effort that is conceptually of great interest is limited because every-
thing in the system is represented by a few variables whose interpreta-
tion then becomes problematic. Looking to the future and recognizing
the value of the objective, I wonder if the model need lead to the use of
the kinds of regional units employed, which are awkward for reasons I
have tried to indicate.
This brings me back to my opening comments. Are we really much
further ahead with a translation of cohort fertility analysis into the
stock-adjustment model at the regional level? Could we not apply the
concept to time series of surveys providing data to relate to ongoing
cohort analyses of major strata? Then such matters as reproductive pref-
erences and many other variables could be obtained from the surveys.
As I understand it, the stock-adjustment model is often used with refer-
ence to a sample of firms; then why not deal with samples of individuals
aggregated into the social units that are socially and economically mean-
ingful, rather than into geographical-administrative units that blur some
important aspects of the dynamics of reproduction?
Comment Riad B. Tabbarah
In the field of the economics of fertility as it stands today, it is impor-
tant to differentiate between theoretical validity and technical sophisti-
cation. While theory can stand on its own, the value of the techniques
in the application of theory depends not only on the inherent quality
and consistency of the techniques, but also on the validity of the theory
itself. The criticisms I shall present of Schultz's paper and, particularly,
of some of its conclusions, relate to the theoretical basis to which the
techniques were applied and not, generally speaking, to the techniques
Riad B. Tabbarah is Chief of the Population Division, United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA). The views expressed in this com-
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themselves. Let me hasten to add that this theoretical shortc<;>ming,
which Schultz readily admits in the introduction to his paper, is to some
extent an unfortunate characteristic of the field he was asked to deal
with.
Children are a peculiar commodity, unlike any other for which eco-
nomic demand theory has been formulated (Leibenstein 1974). The
tools developed in conjunction with demand theory therefore need to be
adapted and supplemented for the analysis of the demand for children.
This is admittedly a very difficult task-one that perhaps requires more
time than has already passed since the field of the economics of fertility
has become popular among economists and that certainly requires more
concentrated effort. The temptation, therefore, has been very strong
among many economists to adapt the problem to their tools rather than
fit their tools to the new problem. Beginning with Becker in 1960, econ-
omists have assumed children to be a consumer durable, a commodity
for which their tools of analysis were highly developed. Schultz assumes
at the outset that "the demand for children [is] in part a demand for a
durable input that enters into many lifetime production and consump-
tion possibilities." Rep.roductive goals are then "summarized in terms
of a desired lifetime stock of children." While this represents, perhaps,
a greater degree of sophistication than Becker's assumption, it remains
basically an attempt at adapting the problem to the tools and not the
other way around.
Schultz readily admits that the theory of demand is not workable
because consumer benefits from children are satiable and because the
cost of funds to invest in children is upward-sloping. But there are
more fundamental reasons why the theory of demand i-s not applicable
in the case of children, and these have to do with the tools underlying
the theory.
Let me take one example-the cost of children. What is important
here, it seems, is the cost of a child relative to the income of the parents.
One may argue that, to the extent that the items of expenditure on the
child in the household budget remain basically the same with develop-
ment, this relationship should remain fairly constant: as the income of
the head of the family rises, his expenditure on, say, food, housing,
and clothing for himself will increase in approximately the same propor-
tion as that spent on the other members of the family. With develop-
ment, however, new items of expenditure on children emerge (notably
education), and this tends to make the burden of dependency relatively
higher, if, of course, a significant cost is attached to education.
But more important than the relative cost of a child is, perhaps, the
relative cost of children. In societies at the very early stages of devel-
opment, a child becomes financially independent of his household (and
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at a relatively early age-say nine years. If we assume that, given the
relatively low fecundity and high infant mortality in these societies, a
child surviving to maturity is born every three years to given parents,
then by the time the fourth child is born the first one becomes financially
independent, by the time the fifth child is born the second becomes
financially independent, and so on, so that the burden of support of
children of this household is limited to three children no matter how
many it eventually produces. By extending the period of support and
reducing the potential interval between surviving children (because of
increased fecundity), the spread of education-and hence development
-increases the cost of children to parents relative to their income in a
very significant fashion. Thus, in a developed country, if parents were
to have, say, eight children spaced two years apart and to be supported
to the age of 17 years, they would at a given moment in their life, be
supporting all eight children at the same time. Therefore, even when
education is free, the relative cost of children increases immensely by
the mere increase in the average schooling period.
This observation has obvious implications for, say, the budget line
in an indifference curve analysis. In a society at the early stages of devel-
opment, the budget line might slope downward from the Y-axis (repre-
senting all other goods) to the point corresponding to two or three
children and then become horizontal to the X-axis (representing num-
ber of children). More popularly stated, if parents in these very under-
developed societies can afford two or three children, they can afford
"as many as God wills."
As we have already learned from various authors (Leibenstein 1957;
Easterlin 1969), a socioeconomic theory of fertility must take into ac-
count, inter alia, the utility and disutility of children, the adequacy of
income given conventional standards (Tabbarah 1972), the cost of a
child also given conventional standards, and the cost of children as
explained earlier. The effect of a given variable on the demand for chil-
dren (that is, on desired family size) can then be assessed in terms of
its effect on these components of household decision-making. For ex-
ample, educational attainment tends to reduce the desire for children
because, among other things, it increases the disutility of children by
opening up competing alternatives, increases the cost of a child because
it represents a new item of expenditure, increases the cost of children
because of the resulting increase in the period of support, and perhaps
also has straining effects on the adequacy of income. Schultz's models
interpret educational attainment as a proxy for the value of time of men
and women, and he finds that, as such, educational attainment is nega-
tively associated with the desire for children. His conclusion is therefore
probably correct. But is the explanation of it an adequate one? Or is
this explanation so partial that it is of limited significance? Schultz280 T.PaulSchultz
himself wonders whether one can sustain the economists' broad and
powerful hypothesis that the productive "value-of-time" is the driving
force behind education's effect on diverse forms of household behavior
and whether there are other aspects of the husband's and wife's eco-
nomic contribution to the family that can be quantified and related to
schooling. The answer to the first question is probably no, and to the
second is probably yes. But what is more important is that this wonder-
ing reflects the limitation of the theoretical base on which the quantita-
tive model is built.
A socioeconomic theory of fertility must also take into account the
fecundity constraint (or supply constraint), which is most evident in
countries and among groups at the early stages of demographic develop-
ment. In these circumstances, at least a large majority of couples are
unable to achieve their desired number of children in their completed
family. This is due not only to a relatively low fecundity (caused by
malnutrition, infections associated with childbearing, and the prevalence
of certain diseases), and to high infant and child mortality, but also to
a relatively high number of children desired. Since Schultz, in drawing
conclusions from his models, takes fertility as a proxy for the desired
number of children-that is, for the demand for children-the existence
of this constraint could considerably weaken the validity of his conclu-
sions. Although Schultz is aware of the difficulty this constraint might
introduce in his models, he nevertheless assumes it away on the grounds
that it is only significant "under extreme conditions of malnutrition and
specific endemic disease, e.g., gonorrhea"-conditions that presumably
did not exist in Taiwan, the country to which his models are applied. I
find this assumption not completely tenable. Because I have been respon-
sible for pointing out this fecundity constraint (Tabbarah 1964) and
have since presented a model of demographic development based on it
(Tabbarah 1971 ), I should perhaps explain in some detail why I believe
Schultz's assumption is not necessarily justified.
The model I am referring to identifies four stages of demographic
development: the first stage is where the desire for children is relatively
high because of prevailing social and economic conditions and where
the maximum attainable number of children is relatively low because of
both low fecundity and high infant and child mortality. At this stage,
a large proportion of couples are unable to attain their desired number
of children and therefore aim at maximum reproduction. Because their
reproductive aims are unattainable, they are often expressed in terms
of "as many as God wills" or "as many as possible," and their knowl-
edge of methods of fertility regulation is limited.
The second stage is reached when the desired number of children
becomes more or less equal to the maximum attainable number owing
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economic conditions and to an increase in the maximum attainable
number mainly owing to the improved health of parents (i.e., higher
fecundity) and of children (i.e., reduced infant and child mortality).
At this stage, a large proportion of couples are able to just attain their
reproductive goals, with a proportion able to exceed them and another
proportion unable to attain them.
At the third stage of demographic development, the desired number
of children becomes lower than the maximum attainable number for the
large majority of couples, creating a potential need for fertility regula-
tion and the use of contraceptive methods. During this stage, however,
lags in the decline of fertility tend to appear because of the lack of
family planning programs and inadequate societal knowledge of contra-
ception, and because of underestimation by couples of the extent of the
decline in mortality and other such factors, thus resulting in a significant
proportion of unwanted births (Tabbarah 1976).
Finally, at the fourth stage of demographic development, which is
characteristic of the developed countries, a situation is reached where
the desired number of children is relatively low and easy to achieve,
and is actually achieved by most couples. (It must be noted that the
population of a given country might be, at any given point, at more than
one stage of demographic development. See Tabbarah [1978]. See also
the model presented in this volume by Easterlin, Pollak, and Wachter.)
Now Schultz maintains that "fertility is generally higher in populations
that experience higher child mortality rates" and that "this evidence is
strongly suggestive of a mechanism, probably both involuntary (bio-
logical) and voluntary (behavioral) in nature, that achieves some man-
ner of population equilibrium given environmental health and economic
constraints." But if the model of demographic development is basically
correct, then it is clear that the relationship between fertility and child
mortality is not as simple as stated here. At the first stage of demo-
graphic development fertility might be low and child mortality high,
while only at the second and third stages would the positive relationship
between fertility and child mortality begin to appear.
What is more important for the present purpose, if such a relationship
(a positive association between fertility and child mortality) was actually
observed in Taiwan when making regional comparisons, as Schultz indi-
cates, then one might draw the conclusion that the various regions of
Taiwan were, in 1966, at the second and third stages of demographic
development. If this is true, it follows that a significant proportion of
couples, at least in some regions, were not achieving their desired num-
ber of children; and their fertility therefore could not be taken as proxy
for their desire for children (i.e., demand for children), as Schultz does
throughout the paper. In fact, the situation is more serious than this,
since women up to the age of 60 and over in 1966 enter into the analy-282 T. Paul Schultz
sis. Many of these women had their main reproductive years sometime
in the 1940s or earlier, a time when Taiwan was undoubtedly at an early
stage of demographic development, where no positive relationship ex-
isted between fertility and desired number of children. Schultz's findings
actually show that the positive relationship between fertility and child
mortality is strong only for the younger age groups; after age 40 the
elasticity of fertility with respect to child mortality becomes almost nil,
and the association eventually becomes negative but loses statistical
significance. Schultz's explanation of this is that, "as a cohort advances
through its life, the elasticity of fertility with respect to child mortality
may be expected to decline, because offspring continue to die after their
mother is unable to replace them with additional births." But consider-
ing the low mortality rates of children after age 15 or 20 when mothers
reach the end of their reproductive years, the fact that even at younger
ages mothers may not replace lost offspring, and the very significant
decline and eventual disappearance of association between fertility and
child mortality, this explanation cannot be readily accepted. The ex-
istence of a fecundity constraint among the older age groups during their
reproductive years seems to offer a much more powerful explanation;
and if this is so, fertility, at least for these women, would not reflect
their desired family size and may not, therefore, be taken as proxy for
their demand for children.
In conclusion, quantitative models like the ones used by Schultz,
which are intended as applications of a given theory, are necessarily
associative. The conclusions derived from them as to the causal relation-
ship between variables can be made only on the basis of the causal
model on which they are based, since correlation by itself does not mean
causation. Thus, if the causal theory is weak or untenable, then the
quantitative associative model based on it is itself necessarily weak, no
matter how internally consistent or sophisticated it is. Considering the
inadequacy of the traditional tools of economic theory in analyzing
the demand for children, it is difficult to develop quantitative associative
models based on them that could satisfactorily explain the mechanism
of household decision-making with regard to desired family size. This
does not mean that associative models, such as the ones Schultz presents,
should not be developed; imperfect as they may be, they generate infor-
mation that itself can be valuable for the eventual development of new
tools and an appropriate causal theory. From this perspective, Schultz's
paper serves the purpose for which it was written-to shed light on
certain important associative relationships between fertility and some
social and economic variables.283 The Decline in Fertility in a Rapidly Developing Country
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